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Defendants reply herewith to the Brief of Appellees herein.
ARGUMENT
It is admitted in this case that Steams Lending, Inc. made a loan to appellant, evidenced by a note and secured by a trust deed, then sold the loan as part of a "securitization" scheme. "Securitization," in simplest terms, sells debts on mortgage loans to a securities broker, which "pools" them, and re-sells them as "mortgage-backed securities."
Originating lenders are paid off in the first sale. Appellees herein are the "nominee,"
Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. ("MERS"), of Steams, and Citimortgage,
Inc., to which MERS assigned the trust deed long after the sale of the loan by Steams.
The Complaint was filed in response to Citimortgage's attempt to foreclose.
The Complaint asserts the securitization, and that the trust deed followed the sale of
the loan, lodging any right to foreclose in the current owner(s) of the debt, under §57-135,UCA(1953).
Appellees filed a motion to dismiss. Recognizing that if the facts alleged in the
Complain were taken as true, the motion must be denied, the district court maneuvered
around appellant's response by converting the motion to one for summary judgment
without notice. Ruling, p.3 et seq.
Citing the rule on summary judgment that the "adverse party may not rest upon the
mere allegations or denials of the pleadings," the district court held that as appellant had
not submitted (and would not be permitted to submit) evidence in support of the factual
allegations of the Complaint, appellees were entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The
l

factual allegation of the Complaint, wholly uncontested by appellees, that the loan had
been sold, activating § 57-1-35, UCA (1953), was treated as "mere conclusory allegations
in a pleading, unsupported by a recitation of relevant surrounding facts." Ruling at 6.
That is, lack of submission of evidence in the converted motion transformed the factual
obligations of the complaint into mere conclusory allegations.
Appellees now concede that the district court's maneuver was without authority and
erroneous. The motion was required to be treated as one to dismiss.
Nevertheless, appellees now claim, upon the ground that the Court of Appeals may
affirm on an alternative basis, that the ruling below can now be affirmed treating the motion as one to dismiss. This ignores the fairly plain fact that the district court would have
denied the motion to dismiss. The apparent explanation for improperly attempting to
shift the burden of proof by conversion to a motion for summary judgment was to avoid
the inevitable result on motion to dismiss.
Further, appellee's renewed claim that "even if the note was securitized, Citi and
MERS are still entitled to enforce it," is simply blank defiance of the statute. Not only is
it not "the great weight of authority" that sale of a debt does not transfer all rights under
the security, there is no authority to such effect.
The correct disposition here is to remand to the district court with instructions to
treat the motion as one to dismiss. Presuming, however, that the district court might have
granted such a motion, appellees' arguments are treated here as a defense of such a decision.

Securitization Cases
This is an action respecting a "securitized" loan - one in which the debt is pooled
with similar debts and sold as "mortgage backed securities" ("MBS"). The debt is evidenced by a Note, and secured by a Trust Deed. The general process of securitization is
described below.
The Securitization Process
The process of securitization (see In re Weisband, Case No. 4:09-bk-05175-EHW
(D. Ariz., 3/29/10) (copy attached, Exhibit "A") involves the "pooling" of debts on many
such notes. The process is essentially identical whether conducted by a government
sponsored agency, such as Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac, or by a "boutique" securitizer.
Pooling occurs when the loans are sold by the originator(s) to a securities broker. The
pooled debt is then "sold" to a Special Purpose Vehicle ("SPV") "trust". This "sale,"
however, is in the form of an exchange. The "trust" takes the loans in original form,
and returns them ("in exchange for") in the form of "certificates." The pooled debt, in
the form of the "certificates" is then sold by the securities broker to investors. Purchasers receive "certificates", as new evidence of the debt. The certificates entitle buyers to
receive payment of the debt. Further, the sale of "certificates" which create a security
interest in the debts creates a security interest in the trust deeds. § 70A-9a-203(7),
UCA (1953). This is in keeping with § 57-1-35, UCA (1953), which provides that
"transfer of any debt secured by a trust deed shall operate as a transfer of the security
therefor."
3

The "trust," having thus been stripped of assets, generally performs no further
services.
This series of transactions is generally represented by a series of documents, including a transfer by the originating lender(s) to a securities broker (commonly, a
"Mortgage Loan Purchase Agreement"), a transfer of the loans by the broker to a
"trust," (a "Mortgage Loan Sale and Assignment Agreement"), and an over-all "Pooling
and Servicing Agreement."
It is typical in securitization that original notes are placed in the hands of a "custodian". It is common that original notes are thereafter "held" by the "custodian", to be
dealt with on behalf of the certificate owners. It is plain that the "custodian" is not a
"holder", or "holder in due course" of the notes, because the custodian does not take the
notes "for value," or with intent that it can enforce them in its own right, as required by
§§ 70A-3-203, 70A-3-302(i)(b), UCA (1953). Further, as there can only be one evidence of the debt, negotiability of the Notes is reduced. It is governed by ownership of
the "certificates". That is, negotiable instruments are converted into securities. § 70-A9a-203(7), UCA (1953).
The Right to Foreclose Has Been Transferred
According to the SEC, "mortgage backed securities are debt obligations that represent claims to cash flows from pools of mortgage loans." There is no question that
investors in mortgage backed securities receive transfer of the debt. The issue then be-

4

comes the effect of §57-1-35, UCA (1953): "The transfer of any debt secured by a trust
deed shall operate as a transfer of the security therefor."
The arrangement is one by which an originator of loans "sells" them to a paper trust,
then takes them back in a different form. As re-acquired, the debts have been "pooled",
and are now represented by certificates constituting parts of the pooled debts (the "Trust
Fund"). The certificates entitle the owners to collect the debts. There is no question that
the certificates represent actual ownership of the debts. The investments are "mortgagebacked securities" (MBS). See Peterson, 28 Cardozo Law Review 2185 (2007) at 2200
et. seq.
At the time of the Pooling and Servicing Agreement, the pool trustee enters into a
servicing agreement with a third party, and a "custodian agreement" with a further party.
The purpose of the servicing agreement is to make collection on the debts, purportedly
for allotment to the holders of certificates. Under the custodian agreement, the custodian
keeps the original notes safe for the benefit of the certificate holders and the trustee of the
purported trust. It is difficult, however, to define an interest of the trustee in the notes following sale of the certificates (unless the trustee is a purchaser of certificates).
The Pooling and Servicing Agreement is not executed by the investors.
To the extent that it represents an agreement for services not to be performed within
one year, a transfer of an interest in realty, including the trustee's powers under a deed of
trust, or an agency agreement, the servicing agreement is subject to the statute of frauds.

5

Further, an agreement subject to the statute offraudscannot be assigned or assumed, except by a writing which satisfies the statute of frauds. §§ 25-5-1, 25-5-4, UCA (1953).
Thus, even it it could be held that the servicer hired by the lender has authority to
foreclose on behalf of the lender (an issue subject to serious question), such authority
terminates upon sale of the certificates, absent some further agreement signed by the investors. (It cannot be signed for them by the pool trustee. An agreement establishing a
trust is also subject to the statute of frauds.)
Where the case involves a securitized debt, and MERS is the defendant, the chain
of foreclosure authority is even more attenuated. As United States District Judge Clark
Waddoups noted recently in such a case:
MERS has no ownership interest in the Note, but
is only acting as a nominee beneficiary.
Cox v. Recontrust Co., Case No. 2:10-CV-492 CW, Memorandum Decision 06/18/10.
Of course, without an ownership interest, there is no authority to foreclose. The same
result has been reached in numerous cases. See Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. v. Chong, Dist. Ct. Case No. 2:09-CV-00661-KJD-LRL, Bankr. Ct. Case No.
BK-S-07-16645-LBR (D. Nev. 2009 en banc) (copy attached, Exhibit "B"), and In re
Walker, Case No. 10-21656-E-ll, (E. Dist. Calif. 5/20/10), (copy attached, Exhibit
"C"):

Further, several courts have acknowledged that MERS is not
the owner of the underlying note and therefore could not
transfer the note, the beneficial interest in the deed of trust, or
foreclose upon the property secured by the deed. See In re

Foreclosure Cases, 521 F. Supp. 2d 650, 653 (S.D. Oh. 2007);
In re Vargas, 396 B.R. 511, 520 (Bankr. CD. Cal. 2008);
Landmark Nat'l Bank v. Kesler, 216 P.3d 158 (Kan. 2009);
LaSalle Bank v. Lamy, 824 N.Y. S. 2d 769 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
2006). Since no evidence of MERS' ownership of the underlying note has been offered, and other courts have concluded
that MERS does not own the underlying notes, this court is
convinced that MERS had no interest it could transfer to Citibank.
Since MERS did not own the underlying note, it could not
transfer the beneficial interest of the Deed of Trust to another.
Any attempt to transfer the beneficial interest of a trust deed
with out ownership of the underlying note is void under California law. Therefore Citibank has not established that it is
entitled to assert a claim in this case.

The Actual Claim
The basis of plaintiff's position in this matter is quite simple. Under ancient common law, the sale of a debt entailed any security for the debt. Carpenter v. Longan, 83
U.S. 271, 275 (1872); Donaldson v. Grant, 49 Pac. 776, 781, (Utah 1897). The common
law rule that "the security follows the debt9' was first codified in California in 1842:
"The assignment of a debt secured by mortgage carries with it the security." Cal. Civ.
Code § 2936. The rule first set down as to mortgages has been codified in Utah with specific regard to trust deeds: "The transfer of any debt secured by a trust deed shall operate
as a transfer of the security therefor." § 57-1-35, UCA (1953).
The effect of this is stated succinctly in In re Vargas, 396 B.R. 511, 516-17 (Bankr.
CD. Calif. 2008):

7

A secured promissory note traded on the secondary mortgage
market remains secured because the mortgage follows the
note. CAL. CIV.CODE § 2936 ("The assignment of a debt
secured by mortgage carries with it the security."). California
codified this principle in 1872. Similarly, this has long been
the law throughout the United States: when a note secured by
a mortgage is transferred, "transfer of the note carries with it
the security, without any formal assignment or delivery, or
even mention of the latter." Carpenter v. Longan. 16 Wall.
271r 83 U.S. 271. 275, 21 L.Ed. 313 (1872). - - G i v e n that
"the debt is the principal thing and the mortgage an accessory," the Supreme Court reasoned that, as a corollary, "[t]he
mortgage can have no separate existence." Carpenter, 83
U.S. at 274, 16 Wall. 271. For this reason, "an assignment of
the note carries the mortgage with it, while an assignment of
the latter alone is a nullity." Id at 274, 16 Wall. 271. While
the note is "essential," the mortgage is only "an incident" to
the note. Id.
Thus, ifFHMhas transferred the note, MERS is no
longer an authorized agent of the holder unless it has a separate agency contract with the new undisclosed principal
MERS presents no evidence as to who owns the note, or of
any authorization to act on behalf of the present owner
(Emphasis added.)
Securitization involves a series of sales of the debt. Generally a lender aggregates a
large number of loans, and sells them to a securities broker. The broker then forms a
Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV), generally in the form of a "trust" with a "trustee." The
broker ("Depositor") delivers the loans to the trustee "in exchange for" "certificettes"
representing the right to collect the debt. The broker resells the Certificates to investors
as "mortgage-backed securities" ("MBS").
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Under the common and statutory law of Utah, the effect of this series of sales of the
debt is to lodge the beneficial interest in the security, the trust deed, in the investors in the
MBS.
It is not plaintiffs position that securitization "splits" the debt and the security, or
that it renders either unenforceable. It is plaintiffs position that securitization lodges
both in the investors in MBS, who alone can enforce them. Original lenders, and those
who are not the end purchasers in the securitization, have been paid off, and cannot foreclose or enforce in their own right. Their only potential right of enforcement can only be
as agents of the investors in MBS.
To assert the latter right, defendants would need to show their status as agents of
such investors. If such status exists, it must exist in the series of securitization documents. Bank ofNew York v. Raftogianis, No. F-7356-09, Sup. Ct. of New Jersey (6/29/
10); (copy attached, Exhibit "D"); U.S. Bank, N.A. v. Ibanez, No. 10694 Supreme Ct. of
Massachusetts (1/7/11) (copy attached, Exhibit "E").
The Note and Trust Deed in Issue
It is common in cases like the present to ignore the terms of the subject Notes and
Trust Deeds, except the references in the Trust Deeds to MERS.
The Note in this matter (Exhibit "A", Addendum to Brief of Appellees) provides:
The Lender or anyone who takes this Note by transfer
and who is entitled to receive payments under this Note is
called the "Note Holder."
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If I am in default, the Note Holder may send me a
written notice telling me that if I do not pay the overdue
amount by a certain date, the Note Holder may require me
to pay immediately the full amount of Principal that has not
been paid and all the interest that I owe on that amount.
That date must be at least 30 days after the date on which
the notice is mailed to me or delivered by other means.
Even if, at a time when I am in default, the Note
Holder does not require me to pay immediately in full as
described above, the Note Holder will still have the right to
do so if I am in default at a later time.
The Trust Deed contains coordinating provisions as follows:
Acceleration; Remedies. Lender shall give notice
to Borrower prior to acceleration following Borrower's
breach of any covenant or agreement in this Security Instrument (but not prior to acceleration under Section 18
unless Applicable Law provides otherwise). The notice
shall specify: (a) the default; (b) the action required to
cure the default; (c) a date, not less than 30 daysfromthe
date the notice is given to Borrower, by which the default
must be cured; and (d) that failure to cure the default on or
before the date specified in the notice may result in acceleration of the sums secured by this Security Instrument
and sale of the Property. The notice shall further inform
Borrower of the right to reinstate after acceleration and the
right to bring a court action to assert the non-existence of
a default or any other defense of Borrower to acceleration
and sale. If the default is not cured on or before the date
specified in the notice, Lender at its option may require
immediate payment in full of all sums secured by this Security Instrument without further demand and may invoke
the power of sale and any other remedies permitted by
Applicable Law. Lender shall be entitled to collect all expenses incurred in pursuing the remedies provided in this
Section 22, including, but not limited to, reasonable attorneys' fees and costs of title evidence.

Under such provisions, the holder of the debt - the person entitled to receive payments under the Note - has the option, in case of non-payment, to accelerate the loan, or
to defer collection to a later time. Enforcement, including acceleration, requires the sending of a written notice. In the absence of the proper written notice, waiver is presumed.
Collection may be waived repeatedly, to and including the last installment on the loan.
The written notice required by the Note plainly is not the statutory Notice of Default subsequently sent by a trustee of the Trust Deed.
The right to accelerate belongs exclusively to the owner of the debt. It does not
belong to the trustee of the trust deed. The trustee must await a proper acceleration of the
loan by the owner of the debt before the trustee can initiate foreclosure under the trust
deed. That is, even if it were possible to leave the trust deed in the hands of the lender or
its nominee following sale of the loan, the result would not be to lodge a right to foreclose in the lender or nominee. Foreclosure could only be initiated by the owner of the
debt (the holder of the note) by acceleration.
There is no evidence that any notice of acceleration was ever sent, by anyone, in
this case. It is not even claimed that any defendant, acting as a properly appointed agent
of the then owner of the debt sent a notice of acceleration. Without examining the documents, based wholly upon failure to make payments to a lender who has sold the debt and
is no longer entitled to receive payments, the district court finds a "default" justifying
foreclosure. There is simply no evidence, or viable claim, of such a default in this case.
The "Contract'' Theory of Trust Deeds in the District of Utah
ll

Appellees rely upon a series of cases in the Utah federal district court which presume that an originating lender never sold the loan, and therefore maintained a right to
foreclose, which it could hire the remaining defendants, including MERS, to enforce.
Such cases, Burnett v. MERS, 2009 WL 3582294 (D. Utah Oct. 27, 2009); Rhodes v.
Aurora Loan Servs., 2010 U.S. Dist. Ct. LEXIS 83133, *6 (D. Utah 2010); McGinnis v.
GMACMort Corp., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90286 *7 (D. Utah 2010), and others are inapposite to the present case. They do not involve the central fact of transfer of the loan.
A number of the federal court cases rely upon simple misquotation of an inapposite case,
La-Rota Florez v. Goldman Sachs Mtg. Co., 2010 WL 1444026 (E. D. Va. 2010), for a
proposition which is irrelevant as well as incorrect. See, e.g., Commonwealth Property
Advocates v. MERS, Case No. 2:10-CV-00340-TS (D. Utah 9/20/10); Commonwealth
Property Advocates v. First Horizon Home Loans, Case No. 2:10-CV-00375 (D. Utah 11/
16/10). They are unreported decisions, most of which are on appeal.
Sale of the subject loan in a securitization activated § 57-1-35, UCA 91953):
The transfer of any loan secured by trust deed shall operate as a
transfer of the security therefor.
Thereupon, the defense alleged by appellees' motion to dismiss collapses.
This is not affected by the fact that the trust deed in this or other cases refers to
MERS as "nominee" for lender and lender's "successors and assigns." Only the lender
can make such a "nomination." Borrower/trustor, who alone signs the trust deed, can
agree to recognize such nomination, but cannot make a further nomination binding upon
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persons who, as a matter of law, succeed to the beneficial interest in the trust deed. Further, the trust deed specifically incorporates local law (see Definition "J" thereof), which
includes § 57-1-35, UCA (1953). That is, those who rely upon the trust deed agree that
sale of the debt passes rights under the trust deed to the new owner of the debt, who then
has any right to "nominate" an agent to exercise such rights.
Simply stated, this means that upon sale of a loan, in a securitization or otherwise,
original "nominees," such as MERS, lose any right to exercise any power under the trust
deed, or to otherwise deal with it, absent some further agreement with the new owner of
the debt. This includes at least any right to substitute trustees, or to foreclose, or to assign
the trust deed. All such actions by MERS in the present case following sale of the loan as
part of a securitization, were simply void.
The trust deed (which is not a contract) was executed only by the borrower. It
expressly incorporates local law, including § 57-1-35. The borrower cannot unilaterally
contract in the trust deed, in violation of § 57-1-35, to make MERS the agent of subsequent buyers of the loan. A separate contract, executed by the present owner(s) of the
debt and MERS would suffice: but no one here suggests that any such contract exists.
Such a separate contract would have to be in writing executed by the present owner of
the debt, under the Utah Statute of Frauds, §§ 25-5-1, 25-5-4(e), UCA (1953), because
it would assign a trust power over realty, and create an agency to sell realty.
The limits of the local federal court "contract" rulings are plain.
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It may be conceded that a lender may appoint a "nominee" to act for it in exercising such powers as it has under a trust deed. It remains curious what the need for such a
stand-in could be, and it may be observed that the federal court has never asked to see
any agreement between the lender and MERS constituting such "nomination." Many
courts simply reject this "straw man" theory of the status of MERS as mere surplusage.
E.g., Landmark Nat'l Bank v. Kessler, 216 R 3d 158 (Kans. 2009); In re Foreclosure
Cases, 521 F. Supp. 2d 650, 653 (S.D. Ohio 2007); In re Walker, Case No. 10-21656-E-ll
(E. Dist. Calif. 5/20/10).
The borrower, who alone signs the trust deed, cannot make such a nomination for
lender. Borrower can only agree to recognize lender's "nominee." Given that the trust
deed incorporates § 57-1-35 UCA (1953), borrower cannot decline to recognize the new
owner of the debt or his "nominee."
In all of this, all courts, including those in the District of Utah, recognize that the
lender, despite the "nomination," initially retains ownership of the debt. MERS obtains
no ownership. Cox v. Recontrust Co., Case No. 2:10-CV-492 CW (D. Utah 6/19/10).
So long, therefore, as MERS acts strictly as the alter-ego of the lender under the trust
deed, there is not necessarily such separation of the debt and the security as renders the
security unenforceable under the statute (§ 57-1-35, UCA (1953)) and common law.
Donaldson v. Grant, 49 Pac. 776, 781 (Utah 1897). Ultimately, the result is the same in
these cases whether the court recognizes the right of MERS to proceed as "nominee", or
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ignores such nomination and requires the lender to proceed in his own name: foreclosure
proceeds on behalf of the lender.
In securitizations, however, the lender retains the debt for the very purpose of selling it, and does so. All courts recognize lenders' right to do so despite "nomination" of
MERS in the trust deed. Sale of the debt transfers all rights under the trust deed, including any right to nominate MERS to exercise rights under the trust deed. Nothing in any
recognition by borrower of lenders' nomination of MERS can change this. Lender ceases
to have any rights under the trust deed upon which MERS can act in lender's behalf. If
MERS would act on behalf of the new owner of the debt, it must show its new "nomination" to do so. In re Vargas, supra; MERS v. Chong, supra; In re Sheridan, supra.
Any theory upon which, following sale of the debt by lender, MERS retains rights
in the trust deed, except as agent of the new owner of the debt, plainly effects a separation
of the debt and security, rendering the security unenforceable. Carpenter v. Longan, supra; Donaldson v. Grant, supra. Such a "contract" would simply be void as in contravention of law, § 57-1-35, UCA(1953).
The recent federal district court decision in Marty v. MERS, No. l:10-cv-00033 (D.
Utah 10/19/10) offers no support for any other conclusion. The part of Marty which suggests that the rule that the security follows the debt may be rendered inapposite by the
distinction in Utah law between mortgages (to which the rule applies) and trust deeds (to
which it may not) (see Marty, pp. 9-11) is dealt with by observing that the statute, §57-135, UCA (1953), expressly applies the rule to trust deeds. There is no question that in
15

Utah, sale of the debt transfers the beneficial interest in any trust deed, and that this is
precisely the same rule as applies to mortgages. Otherwise, Marty purports to be based
upon the principle that "there is no reason to conclude that MERS could not contract with
Plaintiff and other parties to maintain the power to foreclose despite the conveyance of
the ownership of the debt as long as MERS were to act on behalf of those parties who
have the ultimate right to collect the debt " Marty, p. 11 (emphasis added). This principle
is recognized in many cases (e.g., Chong; Walker; Vargas, etc.): MERS could make a
new contract with the new owner of the debt to act as "nominee" for the new owner of
the debt (and have the arrangement acknowledged by "Plaintiff borrower). All such
cases, however, require that MERS show such new contract. Nothing in Marty directly
asserts that, if challenged, MERS could proceed without showing such new contract.
If Marty were to stand for the conclusion that, following a securitization, MERS
owns the trust deed without showing a further contract to act as "nominee" for the new
owner of the debt, the ruling must be based upon a theory that ownership of the debt and
the security can be separated in violation of the law to the contrary, or simply upon a notion that adding MERS as "nominee" in the trust deed is a trick that can be played to
avoid the law that the security follows the debt. In either case, Marty would be wrong on
its face.
All of this means that once a securitization has occurred, the original lender and its
"nominee" transfer to others any right to assign, exercise or enforce any right under the
trust deed, and may not exercise any such right absent proof of an agency to represent the
16

new owners of the debt. Raftogianis, supra. Such agency must be found in the securitization documents.
A series of robo-rulings in the federal court (see, e.g., Commonwealth Property
Advocates, LLC v. First Horizon Home Loan Corp., No. 2:10-CV-375 DB (D. Utah 11/
16/10); Foster v. BAC Home Loan Servicing L.P.y 2:10-CV-247 TS (D. Utah 9/22/10);
Taylor v. Citimortgage, No. 2:10-CV-505 TS (D. Utah 1/28/11)) has, embarrassingly, repeated a misquotation of an inapposite Eastern District of Virginia case, Larota-Florez v.
Goldman Sachs Mortgage Co., 2010 WL 1444026, for the irrelevant and erroneous
proposition that "securitization merely creates 4a separate contract, distinct from Plaintiff[']s debt obligations under the reference credit (i.e. the Note)'" La-Rota Florez is a
summary judgment decision noting particularly that securitization was not shown.
Larota-Florez actually says only that a credit default swap ("CDS") may be regarded as a
separate contract from a note. This has nothing at all to do with whether a securitization
of a debt could be sensibly regarded as a "separate contract" from the note, or whether
such a nonsensical conclusion could affect application of § 57-1-35, UCA (1953). The
proposition that transfer of a debt is a "separate contract" from creation of the debt - true
as far as it goes - provides no exception to the statutory rule that the security follows the
debt, and has no bearing upon the claims in this case. The conclusion, erroneously based
upon Larota-Florez, which says nothing of the sort, that "securitization merely creates 'a
separate contract, distinct from Plaintiff[']s debt obligations under

17

the note'" does

not address any matter at issue, or show that sale of a debt in a securitization has any effect other than that specified by § 57-1-35, UCA (1953) in any other transfer of the debt.
Defendants now rely upon a series of cases arising under the California nonjudicial foreclosure statute, and beginning with Hafiz v. Greenpoint Mortgage Funding,
Inc., 652 F. Supp. 2d 1039, 1043 (N.D. Calif. 2009). See also Lane v. Vitek Real Estate
Indus. Group, 713 F. Supp. 2d 1092, 1099 (E. D. Calif. 2010); Waqavesi v, Indymac Fed.
Bank, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 105555 (11/11/09). A first reading of Hafiz indicates the
reach of these cases. Hafiz notes, in response to a claim that plaintiffs "have not produced the original promissory note" because "the original promissory note was assigned to a trust pool," that the California statute does not require production of the
note to initiate foreclosure. Hafiz does not deal with whether sale of the debt in a securitization transfers the power to foreclose. This is also true of Lane and Waqavesi: they
render no decision on the affect of securitization. They have no further reach than the
Burnett line of cases in the District of Utah. Certainly, they do not represent that securitization does not affect the servicer's right to enforce a note or deed of trust. They do
not represent authority on securitization at all, or have the least affect upon the proper
application of § 57-1-35 of the Utah Code.
Finally, appellees assert that the Complaint does not allege that Steams sold the
debt, and that the allegation of appellant's Brief that thereafter "defendant no longer had
an interest to foreclose" is incorrect because it was Steams which sold the debt, not its
"nominee" MERS. This is mere confusion. The allegation of the Complaint, in para18

graph 19 is that "[t]he obligation under the Note was pooled and sold by Lender," and, in
paragraph 38, that "[a]s a result of such transfers of the Note as a security, the Servicer,
defendant Beneficiaries, and successor Trustee

lacked authority to declare a default

or otherwise pursue collection of the obligation

" Transfer of the debt is plainly fac-

tually asserted.
CONCLUSION
The district court was required to deny appellees9 motion to dismiss.
DATED this 4th day of April, 2011.

E. Craig Sma^ Attorney fohAppellant
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UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT

7I

8
9

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
In re:
Chapter 13
BARRY WEISBAND,
Case No. 4:09-bk-05175-EWH

10
11

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Debtor.

12
13

14
I.

15
16

INTRODUCTION

The debtor, Barry Weisband ("Debtor"), hes challenged the standing of creditor,

17 GMAC Mortgage, LLC ("GMAC"), to seek stay relief on his residence. After reviewing
18 the documents provided by GMAC and conducting an evidentiary hearing, the court
19

concludes that GMAC, the alleged servicer of the Debtor's home loan, lacks standing to

20
21
22

seek stay relief. The reasons for this conclusion are explained in the balance of this
decision.
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

23
24
>5

A.

Creation of Debtor's Note And Asserted Subsequent Transfers

On or about October 6, 2006, the Debtor executed and delivered to GreenPoint

16
Mortgage Funding, Inc. ("GreenPoinf) an adjustable rate promissory note in the

7
8

1 principal sum of $540,000 ("Note") secured by a Deed of Trust ("DOT") on real property
2

located at 5424 East Placita Apan, Tucson, Arizona 857'. 8 ("Property").

3
On a separate piece of paper, GreenPoint endorsed the Note to GMAC

5

("Endorsemenf). The Endorsement is undated. The DOT was signed by the Debtor on

6 October 9, 2006, and recorded on October 13,2006. The DOT lists GreenPoint as the
7

lender, and Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. ("MERS") as the beneficiary

8 of the DOT "solely as nominee for [GreenPoint], its successors and assigns."
9
10

Approximately five months before the creation of the Note and DOT, on April 10,
2006, GreenPoint entered into a Flow Interim Servicing Agreement ("FISA") (Exhibit D) 1

11
12

with Lehman Capital, a division of Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc. (collectively

13 "Lehman"), pursuant to which Lehman agreed to purchase conventional, residential,
14 fixed and adjustable rate first and second lien mortgage loans from GreenPoint. Under
15 the FISA, GreenPoint agreed to service the mortgage loans it sold to Lehman.
16

According to GMAC, GreenPoint transferred the Note and DOT to Lehman under the

17
FISA.

18
On November 1,2006, Lehman entered into a Mortgage Loan Sale and

19

10 Assignment Agreement ("MLSAA") with Structured Asset Securities Corporation
>1 ("SASC) (Exhibit E). Under that agreement, Lehman transferred a number of the

\2 mortgage loans it acquired under the FISA to SASC. GMAC claims that the Note was
3

one of the mortgage loans transferred to SASC. SASC created a trust to hold the

4
transferred mortgages—GreenPoint Mortgage Funding Trust ("Trust"). The MLSAA

5
5

1

Exhibits refer to the exhibits admitted into evidence at a November 10, 2009 evidentiary
hearing.

1 also transferred the right to receive principal and interest payments under the
2

transferred mortgage loans from Lehman to the Trust.

3

Also, on November 1, 2006, SASC entered into a Trust Agreement (Exhibit F)

4
with Aurora Loan Services ("Aurora'') as the master servicer, and U.S. Bank National

5

i Association ("U.S. Bank") as the trustee. A Reconstituted Servicing Agreement

6

7 I (Exhibit G) was executed the same day, which provided that GreenPoint would continue

8 to service the mortgages transferred to the Trust under the MLSAA, but that the Trust
9

could change servicers at any time. Also, according to GMAC, on November 1,2006,

10

GMAC, Lehman, and Aurora entered into a Securitization Servicing Agreement ("SSA")

11

12 |

(Exhibit H), pursuant to which GMAC would service the loans transferred to the Trust.

1GMAC claims that under the SSA it is the current servicer of the Note and DOT.

13

Thus, according to GMAC, as of November 1,2006, the Note and DOT had been

14
transferred to the Trust, with SASC as the Trustor, U.S. Bank as the Trustee, Aurora as

15

16 the master servicer, and GMAC as the sub-servicer. GreenPoint went out of business
17

in 2007. According to GMAC, it remains the sub-servicer of the Note, and that is its only

18

financial interest in the Note and DOT. (Transcript Nov. 10,2009, pp. 44,47, 75.)

19

201

B.

21

As of March 1, 2009, the Debtor was in default of his obligations under the Note.

22
23

Bankruptcy Events

Debtor filed his petition for relief under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code on March 19,
I 2009. On May 16, 2009, GMAC filed a proof of claim ("POO"), which attached the Note

24
and DOT. The Endorsement from GreenPoint to GMAC was not attached to GMAC's

25

16
\1
.8

proof of claim. On May 12, 2009, MERS, as nominee for GreenPoint, assigned its

1 interest in the DOT to GMAC ("MERS Assignmenf). The MERS Assignment was
2
3

recorded on Juiy 16, 2009.
GMAC filed a Motion for Relief from Stay ("Motion") on May 29,2009, on the

4
5

grounds that the Debtor had no equity in the Property and the Property was not

6

necessary for an effective reorganization. The Motion also requested adequate

7

protection payments to protect GMAC's alleged interest in the Property. GMAC

8 attached the Note with the Endorsement and DOT as exhibits to the Motion.
9
10

The Debtor filed a response challenging GMAC's standing to seek relief from
stay. After various discovery disputes, GMAC sent a letter dated September 17, 2009,

11
12

to the Debtor which purported to explain the various transfers of the Note and the DOT.

13 (Docket #90). The letter explained that GreenPoint transferred the "subject loan" to
14 Lehman under the FISA, that Lehman sold the "subject loan" to SASC under the
15 MLSAA, that SASC, Aurora Loan Services, and U.S. National Bank entered into a trust
16

agreement, which created the Trust and made Aurora the master servicer for the

17
"subject loan," and, that GMAC was the servicer of the "subject loan" under the SSA.

18
L9

| According to GMAC, its status as servicer, along with the Endorsement of the Note to

20

GMAC and the assignment of the DOT from MERS to GMAC, demonstrated that it had

21

standing to bring the Motion.

22
>3

On November 10,2009, the Court conducted an evidentiary hearing on the
Motion. GMAC offered the original Note at the hearing snd admitted into evidence a

14
copy of the Note, DOT, copies of the FISA, MLSAA, Trust Agreement, the Reconstituted

5
6

Servicing Agreement and the SSA. However, GMAC did not offer any documents

7 demonstrating how the Note and DOT were conveyed by GreenPoint to the FISA. No
4

I
1 document was offered demonstrating how the Note and DOT were conveyed from the
2

1 FiSA to the MLSAA or from the MLSAA into the Trust. Schedule A-1 of the MLSAA,

3„

where the transferred mortgages presumably would have been listed, only has the

4I

\ words intentionally Omitted" on it, and Schedule A-2 has the word "None." (Exhibit F,

6

| pp. 19-20). Similarly, there is no evidence that the Note and DOT are subject to the

7 I SSA. Exhibit A to the SSA, titled "Mortgage Loan Schedule," is blank. At the
8

| conclusion of the hearing, this Court ordered the Debtor to begin making adequate

9
10

protection payments commencing on December 1, 2009 to the Chapter 13 Trustee.
The Court further ordered GMAC and the Debtor to negotiate the amount of the

11
12

adequate protection payments. When the parties were unable to reach agreement, the

13 Court set the amount of the monthly payments at $1,000.
HI. ISSUE

14
15

Does GMAC have standing to bring the Motion?

16

rV. JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

17
Jurisdiction is proper under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1334(a) and 157(b)(2)(G).
18
V. DISCUSSION

19
20 A.

Introduction

21

Section 362(a) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that the filing of a bankruptcy

22

petition operates as a stay of collection and enforcement actions. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a).

23
The purpose of the automatic stay is to provide debtors with "protection against hungry
24
25

creditors" and to assure creditors that the debtor's other creditors are not "rscing to

26 various courthouses to pursue independent remedies to drain the debtor's assets."
27 In re Tippett, 542 F.3d 684, 689-80 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Dean v. Tmns World Airlines,
28

5

1 Inc., 72 F.3d 754, 755-56 (9th Cir. 1995)); see also In re Johnston, 321 B.R. 262, 2732
3

74 (D. Ariz. 2005). Despite the broad protection the stay affords, it is not without limits.
Section 362(d) allows the court, upon request of a "party in interest," to grant relief from

4
5
6

the stay, "such as terminating, annulling, modifying, or conditioning such stay."
111 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1). The court may grant relief "for cause, including the lack of

7 I adequate protection." Id. The court may also grant relief from the stay with respect to
8
9
10

specific property of the estate if the debtor lacks equity in the property and the property
is not necessary to an effective reorganization. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(2).
Any party affected by the stay should be entitled to seek relief. 3 COLLIER'S ON

11
12
13

BANKRUPTCY If

362.07[2] (Henry Somers & Alan Resnick, eds. 15th ed., rev. 2009);

I Matter of Brown Transp. Truckload, Inc., 118 B.R. 889, 893 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1990); In

14 I re Vieland, 41 B.R. 134,138 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1984)). Relief from stay hearings are
15

limited in scope—the validity of underlying claims is not litigated. In re Johnson,

16

756 F.2d 738, 740 (9th Cir. 1985). As one court has noted, B[s]tay relief hearings do not

17

involve a full adjudication on the merits of claims, defenses or counterclaims, but simply

18
19
20
21

a determination as to whether a creditor has a colorable claim." In re Emrich, 2009
WL 3816174, at *1 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2009).
Nevertheless, in order to establish a colorable claim, e movent for relief from stay

22 bears the burden of proof that it has standing to bring the motion. In re Wilhelm,
23

407 B.R. 392,400 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2009). The issue of standing involves both

24
"constitutional limitations on federal court jurisdiction and prudential limitations on its
15
16
7
8

exercise." Werth v. Seldin, All U.S. 490, 498 (1975). Constitutional standing concerns
whetner the plaintiffs personal stake in the lawsuit is sufficient to hs.ve a "case or
6

controversy" to which the federal judicial power may extend under Article III. Id.; see
also Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 558-60 (1992); Pershing Park Villas
Homeowners Ass'n v. UnitedPac. Ins. Co., 219 F.3d 895, 699 (9th Cir. 2000).
Additionally, the "prudential doctrine of standing has come to encompass several
f judicially self-imposed limits on the exercise of federal jurisdiction.'" Pershing Park

6

7 I Villas, 219 F.3d at 899. Such limits are the prohibition on third-party standing and the
8

9
9

| requirement that suits be maintained by the real party in interest. See Warth v. Seldin,
1422 U.S. at 498-99; Gilmartin v. City of Tucson, 2006 WL 5917165, at *4 (D. Ariz.

of

10

12006). Thus, prudential standing requires the plaintiff to assert its own claims rather
I than the claims of another. The requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 17, made applicable in
13 | stay relief motions by Rule 9014, "generally falls within the prudential standing doctrine."
14 J In re Wilhelm, 407 B. R. at 398.
15
16 B.
I

GMAC's Standing
GMAC advances three drfferent a r g u m e n t s ,.„ 8 u p p o r f ^

^

^

18

inters w«, standing to see. reiief from s t a ,
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because the Note was endorsed «o GMAC and GMAC has physical possession O n e
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addresses each of GMAC's cfcims in turn.

^

1

1.

2
3

GMAC Has Not Demonstrated That It Is A Hoider Of The Note

If GMAC is the holder of the Note, GMAC would be a party injured by the
Debtor's failure to pay it, thereby satisfying the constitutional standing requirement.

4
5

GMAC would also be the real party in interest under Fed. R. Civ. P. 17 because under
("A.R.S.') § 47-3301, the holder of a note has the right to enforce it.2

6

ARIZ. REV. STAT.

7

However, as discussed below, GMAC did not prove it is the holder of the Note.

8

Under Arizona law, a holder is defined as "the person in possession of a

9
10

negotiable instrument that is payable either to bearer or to an identified person that is
the person in possession." A.R.S. § 47-1201 (B)(21)(a).3 GMAC has

11
12
13

failed to demonstrate that it is the hoider of the Note because, while it was in
possession of the Note at the evidentiary hearing, it failed to demonstrate that the Note

14 is properly payable to GMAC. A special endorsement to GMAC was admitted into
15 evidence with the Note. However, for the Endorsement to constitute part of the Note, it
16

must be on "a paper affixed to the instrument.'' A.R.S. § 47-3204; see also In re Nash,

17
49 B.R. 254, 261 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1985). Here, the evidence did not demonstrate that

18
19
20

the Endorsement was affixed to the Note. The Endorsement is on a separate sheet of
paper; there was no evidence that it was stapled or otherwise attached to the rest of the

21
2

Because there is no federal commercial law which defines who is a note holder, the court
must look to Arizona law to determine if GMAC is a holder. In re Montagne, 421 B.R. 65, 73
(Bankr. D. Vt. 2009) ("Bankruptcy law does not generally provide for the enforcement of
23 | promissory notes. As a result, the legal obligations of the parties are determined by applicable
24 non-bankruptcy law, which is usually state law.").

22

3

Arizona substantially adopted the 1972 revised, version of the Uniform Commercial Code
CUeC") in 1975. See Fin. Mgmt. Servs., Inc. v. Familian Corp., 183 Ariz. 497,499 n.1 (Ct. App.
16 1995); Wollenberg v. Phoenix Leasing Inc., 182 Ariz. 4, 7 n. 2 (Ct. App. 1994). In 1993,
Arizona adopted the 1990 revision of UCC Article 3. Fin. Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 183 Ariz, at 502
'.7 n.2.

1 I Note. Furthermore, when GMAC filed its proof of claim, the Endorsement was not
2

I included, which is a further indication that the allonge containing the Endorsement was

3I

| not affixed to the Note.4

4j
5

I

6

In Adams v. Madison Realty & Dev., Inc., 853 F.2d 163 (3d Cir. 1988), the

I plaintiffs executed promissory notes which, after a series of transfers, came into the

7 | defendant's possession. At issue was whether the defendant was the rightful owner of
8

I the notes. The court held that the defendant was not entitled to holder in due course

10 status because the endorsements failed to meet the UCC's fixation requirement. Id. at
11 168-69. The court relied on UCC section 3-202(2) [A.R.S. §47-3204]: "An indorsement
12
must be written by or on behalf of the holder and on the instrument or on a paper so

13 1
firmly affixed thereto as to become a part thereof." Id. at 165. Since the endorsement

14
page, indicating that the. defendant was the holder of the note, was not attached to the

15

16 note, the court found that the note had not been properly negotiated. Id. at 166-67.
17 Thus, ownership of the note never transferred to the defendant. Applying that principle
18 to the facts here, GMAC did not become a holder of the Note due to the improperly
19
affixed special endorsement.

20 |

While the bankruptcy court in In re Nash, 49 B.R. 254 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1985)

21 I found that holder in due course status existed even though an allonge was not properly
22

| affixed to an instrument, the court based its determination on the clear intention thst the

23
4

The special endorsement to GMAC is also completely inconsistent with the securitization of
the note into the Trust which GMAC asserts occurred shortly after it was executed by the
25 Debtor. According to GMAC, the Note and DOT were conveyed by GreenPoint to Lehman and
ultimatelytoa Trust. But if the Note was endorsed to GMAC, GreenPoint would not have been
26 able to convey the Note—only GMAC as the holder of the note could have conveyed it

24

27
28

1 note assignment be physically attached because: (1) the assignment was signed and
2
3

notarized the same day as the trust deed; (2) the assignment specifically referenced the
escrow number; (3) the assignment identified the original note holder; and (4) the

4
5

assignment recited that the note was to be attached to the assignment. Id. at 261.
In this case, however, there is no proof that the allonge containing the special

6

7 endorsement from GreenPoint to GMAC was executed at or near the time the Note was
8 executed. Furthermore, the Endorsement does not have any identifying numbers on it,
9

such as an account number or an escrow number, nor does it reference the Note in any

10
way. There is simply no indication that the allonge was appropriately affixed to the

11
12

Note, in contradiction with the mandates of A.R.S. § 47-3204. Thus, there is no basis in

13 this case to depart from the general rule that an endorsement on an allonge must be
14

affixed to the instrument to be valid.

15
16
17

GMAC cannot overcome the problems with the unaffixed Endorsement by its
physical possession of the Note because the Note was not endorsed in blank and, even
if it was, the problem of the unaffixed endorsement would remain.5 As a result, because

18
19
20

GMAC failed to meet its burden of demonstrating that the Endorsement was proper, it
has failed to demonstrate that it is the holder of the Note.

11
52

3
4
5
15

If the Note was endorsed in blank (and the Endorsement was properly affixed to the Note), it
would be a bearer instrument and, therefore, enforceable by the parry in physical possession.
r See InreHill, 2009 WL 1956174, *2 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2009).

S

10

1

2.

2

The MERS Assignment Of The DOT Did Not Provide GMAC With
Standing

GMAC argues that it has standing to bring the Motion as the assignee of MERS. 6

3
4

In this case, MERS is named in the DOT as a beneficiary, solely as the "nominee" of

5

GreenPoint, holding only "legal title" to the interests granted to GreenPoint under the

6

DOT. A number of cases have held that such language confers no economic benefit on

7
MERS. See, e.g., In re Sheridan, 2009 WL 631355, *4 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2009); In re

8
9

Mitchell, 2009 WL 1044368, *3-4 (Bankr. D. Nev. 2009); In re Jacobson, 402 B.R. 359,

10 367 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 2009). As noted by the Sheridan court, MERS "collects] no
11

money from [djebtors under the [njote, nor will it realize the value of the [property

12 through foreclosure of the [d]eed of [tjrust in the event the [n]ote is not paid." 2009 WL
13

I 631355 at *4.

14
Because MERS has no financial interest in the Note, it will suffer no injury if the

15
16

Note is not paid and will realize no benefit if the DOT is foreclosed. Accordingly, MERS

17 | cannot satisfy the requirements of constitutional standing. GMAC, as MERS' assignee

18 of the DOT, "stands in the shoes" of the assignor, taking only those rights and remedies
19 the assignor would have had. Hunnicutt Constr., Inc. v. Stewart Title & Trust of Tucson,
20
Trust No. 3496,187 Ariz. 301, 304 (Ct. App. 1996) citing Van Waters & Rogers v.

21
22

Interchange Res., Inc., 14 Ariz. App. 414,417 (1971); In re Boyajian, 367 B.R. 138,145

23

M
6

7

MERS' primary function is to act as a document custodian. Major players in the mortgage
lending industry created MERS to simplify the process of transfening mortgages by avoiding the
needtore-record liens—and pay court recorder filing fees—each time it is assigned.
Christopher L. Peterson, Predatory Structured Finance, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 2185, 2266-67
(2007).

8

11

15
,6

(9th Cir. BAP 2007). Because GMAC is MERS' assignee, it cannot satisfy the
requirements of constitutional standing either.7
3.

GMAC Does Not Have Standing As The Servicer Of The Note
(a)

Servicer's Right To Collect Fees For Securitized Mortgages

Securitization of residential mortgages is "the process of aggregating a
7 | large number of notes secured by deeds of trust in what is called a mortgage pool, and
8

I then selling security interests in that pool of mortgages." Kurt Eggert, Held Up In Due

9I
J Course: Predatory Lending, Securitization, and the Holder in Due Course Doctrine,
01
11 fi
I 35 CREIGHTON L. REV. 503, 536 (2002). The process begins with a borrower negotiating
j with a mortgage broker for the terms of the loan. Then, the mortgage broker either
13 | originates the loan in its own name or in the name of another entity, which presumably
14 I provides the money for the loan. Almost immediately, the broker transfers the loan to
J5

17

1 the funding entity. "This lender quickly sells the loan to a different financial entity, which
• pools the loan together with a host of other loans in a mortgage pool." id. at 538.

18
19
20 J 7 The Arizona District Court has rer^nfiw h«w *u *.«-««
of trust, oould appoint a t^SS^riSSSiSSSi'
21

T

1

beneficiar

y under • * "

>2 I 2trt,f,cates' Series2006-5,2009 WL482701fiS7A2T SSKF J ? ^ ' Bac^ Pass-Through
- 2 I WL 3174823 (D. Ariz. 2009) Those, * 2 ~ 1 ( A n i 2 0 0 9 ) ; *«w * An.'« Se/v. Co 2009
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e is presumably either the holder of the contract or the

1

The assignee then transfers the mortgages in the pool to another entity,

2 which in turn transfers the loans to a special purpose vehicle ("SPV",) whose sole role is
3
to hold the pool of mortgages. Id, at 539. "The transfer to the special purpose trust

4
5

must constitute a true sale, so that the party transferring the assets reduces its potential

6

liability on the loans and exchanges the fairly illiquid loans for much more liquid cash."

7

Id. at 542. Next, the SPV issues securities which the assignee sells to investors. Id. at

8 539.
9
10

Once the securities have been sold, the SPV is not actively involved. It
"does not directly collect payments from the homeowners whose notes and deeds of

11
12
13

| trust are held by the SPV." Id. at 544. Rather, servicers collect the principal and
interest payments on behalf of the SPV. Id. Fees are associated with the servicing of

14 loans in the pool. Therefore, GMAC would have constitutional standing if it is the
15 servicer for the Note and DOT because it would suffer concrete injury by not being able
16

to collect its servicing fees.8 In re O'Kelley, 420 B.R. 18, 23 (D. Haw. 2009). In this

17
case, however, the evidence does not demonstrate that the Note and DOT were

18
19
20

transferred to the Trust, and, without that evidence, there is no demonstration that
GMAC is the servicer of the Note.

21
22
23
24
25

8

27

Even if a servicer has constitutional standing, it may still not be the "real party in interesf
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 17 and may not, therefore, be able to satisfy the requirements for
prudential standing. See, e.g., In re Jacobson, 402 B.R. 359, 365-66 (Bankr. W.D. Wash.
2009); In re Hwang, 396 B.R. 757, 767 (Bankr. CD. Cal. 2008).

28

13

26

1

(b)

2

There Is Insufficient Evidence That The Note Was Sold To Lehman
And Became Part Of The Trust

When the Debtor executed the Note and DOT, GreenPoint was the

3
4

original holder of the Note and the economic beneficiary of the DOT. GreenPoint,

5

allegedly, transferred the Note to Lehman pursuant to the FISA. However, the term

6

"mortgage loans" is not defined in the FISA and GMAC's documents regarding the

7
8
9

securitization of the Note and DOT provide no evidence of actual transfers of the Note
and DOT to either the FISA or the Trust. Because such transfers must be "true sales,"

10 • they must be properly documented to be effective. Thus, to use an overused term,
11

GMAC has failed "to connect the dots" to demonstrate that the Note and DOT were

12 securitized. Accordingly, it is immaterial that GMAC is the servicer for the Trust.
13
C.

Debtor's Other Arguments

14
15
16
17
18
19

20 S

1.

Securities Investors Are Not The Only Individuals Who Can Satisfy
Standing Requirements When Dealing With A 362 Motion on a
"Securitized" Mortgage

The Debtor argues that, in an asset securitization scheme, only the securities
investors have standing to seek stay relief because they are the only parties with a
financial interest in the securitized notes. However, because the Debtor executed the
Note and received consideration (which he used to purchase the house), the contract

21
22

is enforceable regardless of who provided the funding. In other words, the fact that the

23

funds for a borrower's loan are supplied by someone other than the loan originator,

24

does not invalidate the loan or restrict enforcement of the loan contract to the parties

25

who funded the loan. A number of cases and treatises recognize that consideration for

26

a contract, including a promissory note, can be provided by a third party. See, e.g.,

27
28

14

DCMLtd. P'ship v. Wang, 555 F. Supp. 2d 808, 817 (E.D. Mich. 2008); Buffalo County
v. Richards, 212 Neb. 826, 828-29 (Neb. 1982); 3 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 7:20
(Richard A. Lord, 4th ed. 2009); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 71(4)
(2009).
Notes are regularly assigned and the assignment does not change the nature of
the contract. The assignee merely steps into the shoes of the assignor. In re Boyajian,
367 B.R. 138,145 (9th Cir. BAP 2007); In re Trejos, 374 B.R. 210, 215 (9th Cir. BAP
2007). No additional consideration is required, as opposed to a novation which creates
a new obligation. Id. at 216-17 citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 280,
cmt. e. Therefore, the Debtor's argument that the Note is unenforceable because the
funder of the Note was not the payee fails. The Note is still valid and can be enforced
by the party who has the right to enforce it under applicable Arizona law.
2.

Proof Of A Note's Entire Chain Of Ownership Is Not Necessary For Stay
Relief

A movant for stay relief need only present evidence sufficient to present a
colorable claim—not every piece of evidence that would be required to prove the right
to foreclose under a state law judicial foreclosure proceeding is necessary. In re
Emhch, 2009 WL 3816174, at*1 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2009). Accordingly, not every
movant for relief from stay has to provide e complete chain of a note's assignment to
obtain relief.
Arizona's deed of trust statute does not require a beneficiary of a deed of trust
to produce the underlying note (or its chain of assignment) in order to conduct a
Trustee's Sale. Blau v. Am.'s Serv. Co., 2009 WL 3174823, at *6 (D. Ariz. 2009);

15

1 1 Mansourv. Cal~W. Reconveyance Corp,, 618 F. Supp. 2d 1178, 1181 (D. Ariz. 2009);
2 l!

Diessner v. Mortg. Bee. Registration Sys., 618 F. Supp. 2d 1184,1187 (D. Ariz. 2009).

3"
It would make no sense to require a creditor to demonstrate more to obtain stay relief
| than it needs to demonstrate under state law to conduct a judicial or non-judicial
foreclosure. Moreover, if a note is endorsed in blank, it is enforceable as a bearer

6

7 I instrument. See in re Hill, 2009 WL 1956174, at *2 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2009). Therefore,
8

this Court declines to impose a blanket requirement that all movants must offer proof of

90
a note's entire chain of assignments to have standing to seek relief although there may
10
be circumstances where, in order to establish standing, the movant will have to do so.

11 J
_ I

3.

The Movant Has Not Violated Rule 9011

12 J
13

K

14

The Debtor argues that GMAC "violated Rule 7011" by presenting insufficient
and misleading evidence. Given that there is no Rule 7011, the Court assumes that

15

A the Debtor was actually referring to Bankruptcy Rule 9011. Rule 9011 allows a court to
\(\ II
I impose sanctions for filing a frivolous suit. FED. R. BANKR. P. 9011 (c); see also FED. R.

17 I

0 Civ. P. 1 1(C). AS noted at the evidentiary hearing, the Court did not find that GMAC

18
Q

B

„ filed its motion for relief stay in bad faith, nor does this Court believe GMAC filed its

20 | motion thinking it did not have proper evidentiary support. There are numerous, often
21

conflicting, decisions on the issues of "real party in interesf and constitutional standing,

22

| and what evidence must be presented by a servicer seeking stay relief. The record in
23 „
this case does not support imposition of 9011 sanctions.
24"
25
26
27
28 II

16

VI.

CONCLUSION

GMAC has not demonstrated that it has constitutional or prudential standing
is the real party in interest entitled to prosecute a motion for relief from stay.
Accordingly, its motion Is DENIED without prejudice.
Dated and signed above.
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to the following:
Barry Weisband
5424 East Placita Apan
Tucson, AZ 85718
Ronald Ryan
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Chapter 13 Trustee
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7

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

8

DISTRICT OF NEVADA

9

!

10 MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC
REGISTRATION SYSTEMS, INC.,
11
Appellant,
12|

Dist. Ct. Case No. 2:09-CV-00661-KJD-LRL

13

ORDER

Bankr. Ct. Case No. BK-S-07-16645-LBR

LISA MARIE CHONG, LENARD E.
141 SCHWARTZER, BANKRUPTCY
TRUSTEE, etal,
15
Appellees.
16
17
Presently before the Court is Appellant's Appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 158(a)fromthe
18
Bankruptcy Court's Order Denying Motion to Lift Stay entered in the Adversary Proceeding No. BK19
S-07-16645-LBR, docket no. 49, March 31, 2009. Having considered the briefs and the record on
20
appeal, including the arguments of parties at the consolidated hearing on November 10, 2009, the
21
Court affirms the Order of the Bankruptcy Court.
22
I. Procedural History and Facts
23
On April 14, 2009, Appellant Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. ("MERS") filed
24|
Notice of Appeal (#1) appealing the Bankruptcy Court's order denying Appellant's motion for relief
25
261
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1 from stay. This appeal is one of approximately eighteen (18) similar cases in which the Bankruptcy
2 Court ruled that Appellant lacked standing to bring the motion.
3

Li the underlying bankruptcy action, MERS filed its Motion for Relief from Stay ("the

4 Motion") pursuant to Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Practice ("Rule") 4001 on January 14, 2008
5 seeking to have the automatic stay lifted so that MERS could conduct a non-judicial foreclosure sale
6 on debtor's real property because the debtor lacked the ability to make payments and could not
7 provide adequate security. Trustee Lenard E. Schwartzer ("Trustee") filed objections to the Motion
8 claiming that MERS did not have standing as a real party in interest under the Rules to file the
9 motion. (Appellant's Appendix ("Appx.") Doc. No. 12, p. 34). In response, Appellant filed the
10 Declaration of Faatima Straggans, an employee of Homecomings Financial, LLC the authorized
11 servicing agent for MERS, attempting to authenticate a copy of the original Deed of Trust ("Deed")
12 and Note. (Appx. 36-38). The Deed described MERS as beneficiary and identified MERS as the
13 nominee of the original lender, FMC Capital LLC. Id. However, the Declaration identified neither
14 the current owner of the beneficial interest in the Note, nor any of the successors or assignees of the
15 Deed of Trust. The Declaration also failed to assert that MERS, FMC Capital LLC or Homecomings
16 Financial, LLC held the Note.
17

Due to the similar issues raised regarding motions for relief from stay in approximately

18 twenty-seven (27) cases involving MERS, the Bankruptcy Court set a joint hearing for all twenty19 seven cases. (Appx. 113-18). The Bankruptcy Court also ordered consolidated briefing for all cases
20 to be filed in Case No. 07-16226-LBR, In re Mitchell, the "lead case". Id. In a majority of the cases,
21 including the present case, Appellant attempted to withdraw the Motion but was procedurally unable
22 to do so, because the Trustee would not consent. (Appx. 1383, 1902-1904, 1907-1909). MERS
23 informed the Bankruptcy Court that it had attempted to withdraw the Motion, because it had been
24 filed contrary to its own corporate procedures. (Appx. 432). Particularly in this case, MERS was
25 unable to show that a MERS Certifying Officer was in physical possession of the Note at the time the
26 Motion was filed. (Appx. 624).
2
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Afinalhearing was held on August 19, 2008. (Appx. 650-729). On March 31, 2009, the

2 Bankruptcy Court issued Memorandum Opinions and Orders denying MERS' motions for relief from
3 stay in Mitchell and two other cases. (Appx. 740-54, 1581-95,1959-72). In the remaining cases,
4 including the present case, the Bankruptcy Court denied the motions for relief from stay by
5 incorporating the reasoningfromthe Mitchell Memorandum Opinion. (Appx.46). •
6

The Bankruptcy Court held that MERS lacked standing because it was not a real party in

7 interest as required by the Rules. (Appx. 740-54). Specifically, the court found that "[w]hile MERS
8 may have standing to prosecute the motion in the name of its Member as nominee, there is no
9 evidence that the named nominee is entitled to enforce the note or that MERS is the agent of the
10 note's holder." (Appx. 753). The court further held that MERS' asserted interest as beneficiary
11 under the contract terms did not confer standing because MERS had no actual beneficial interest in
12 the note and, therefore, was not a beneficiary. (Appx. 745-48).
13

MERS now appeals that order asserting that the Bankruptcy Court erred as a matter of law

14 when it determined that MERS may not be a beneficiary under the deeds of trust at issue in the
15 eighteen consolidated cases where the express language of the deeds of trust provide that MERS is
16 the beneficiary. The Trustee continues to assert that MERS lacks standing because it is not a real
17 party in interest.
18 II. Standard of Review
19

This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 158(a) and reviews the Bankruptcy

20 Court's findings under the same standard that the court of appeals would review a district court's
21 findings in a civil matter. 28 U.S.C. § 158(c)(2). Therefore, the Court reviews the Bankruptcy
22 Court's factual findings under a clearly erroneous standard, and conclusions of law de novo. See In
23 re Healthcentral.com, 504 F.3d 775, 783 (9th Cir. 2007); In re First Magnus Fin. Corp., 403 B.R.
24 659, 663 (D. Ariz. 2009).
25
26
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1 HI. Analysis
2

This appeal arises from eighteen cases in which MERS filed motions for relief from stay in

3

the Bankruptcy Court. In each case, either a party or the Bankruptcy Court raised the issue of

4

whether MERS had standing to bring the motion. In holding that MERS did not have standing as the

5 real party in interest to bring the motion for relief from stay, the Bankruptcy Court determined that
6

MERS was not a beneficiary in spite of language that designated MERS as such in the Deed of Trust

7

at issue. MERS seeks to overturn the Bankruptcy Court's determination that it is not a beneficiary.

8 However, the Court must affirm the Bankruptcy Court's order under the facts presented because
9
10

MERS failed to present sufficient evidence demonstrating that it is a real party in interest.
A motion for relief from stay is a contested matter under the Bankruptcy Code. See Fed. R.

11 Bankr. P. 4001(a); 9014(c). Bankruptcy Rule 7017 applies in contested matters. Rule 7017
12 incorporates Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(a)(1) which requires that "[a]n action must be
13 prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest." See also, In re Jacobson, 402 B.R. 359, 365-66
14 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 2009); In re Hwang, 396 B.R. 757, 766-67 (Bankr. CD. Cal. 2008). Thus,
15 while MERS argues the bankruptcy court erred when it determined that MERS was not a beneficiary
16 under the deeds of trust, MERS only has standing in the context of the motion to lift stay under the
17
18

Rules if it is the real party in interest. See Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7017.
Since MERS admits that it does not actually receive or forfeit money when borrowers fail to

19 make their payments, MERS must at least provide evidence of its alleged agency relationship with
20

the real party in interest in order to have standing to seek relief from stay. See Jacobson, 402 B.R. at

21

366, n.7 (quoting Hwang, 396 B.R. at 767 ("the right to enforce a note on behalf of a noteholder does

22

not convert the noteholder's agent into a real party in interest")). An agent for the purpose of

23

bringing suit is "viewed as a nominal rather than a real party in interest and will be required to

24

litigate in the name of his principal rather than his own name." Hwang, 396 B.R. at 767. This is

25

particularly important in the District of Nevada where the Local Rules of Bankruptcy Practice require

26

parties to communicate in good faith regarding resolution of a motion for relief from stay before it is
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filed. LR 4001(a)(3). The parties cannot come to a resolution if those with a beneficial interest in
the note have not been identified and engaged in the communication.
In the context of a motion for relief from stay, the movant, MERS in this case, bears the
burden of proving it is a real party in interest. In re Wilhelm, 407 B.R. 392, 400 (Bankr. D. Idaho
2009)(citing In re Hayes, 393 B.R. 259, 267 (Bankr. D.Mass. 2008)('To have standing to seek relief
from the automatic stay, [movant] was required to establish that it is a party in interest and that its
rights are not those of another entity5')). Initially, a movant seeking relief from stay may rely upon its
motion. Id. However, if a trustee or debtor objects based upon standing, the movant must come
forward with evidence of standing. Id.; Jacobson, 402 B.R. at 367 (requiring movant at least
demonstrate who presently holds the note at issue or the source of movant's authority).
Instead of presenting the evidence to the Bankruptcy Court, MERS attempted to withdraw the
Motion from the Bankruptcy Court's consideration, citing the failure of a MERS Certifying Officer
to demonstrate that a member was in physical possession of the promissory note at the time the
motion was filed.1 The only evidence provided by MERS was a declaration that MERS had been
identified as a beneficiary in the deed of trust and that it had been named nominee for the original
lender. Since MERS provided no evidence that it was the agent or nominee for the current owner of
the beneficial interest in the note, it has failed to meet its burden of establishing that it is a real party
in interest with standing. Accordingly, the order of the Bankruptcy Court must be affirmed.
This holding is limited to the specific facts and procedural posture of the instant case. Since
the Bankruptcy Court denied the Motion without prejudice nothing prevents Appellant from refiling
the Motion in Bankruptcy Court providing the evidence it admits should be readily available in its
system. The Court makes no finding that MERS would not be able to establish itself as a real party
in interest had it identified the holder of the note or provided sufficient evidence of the source of its
authority.
l

Jn other cases movant did not seek to withdraw the Motion, but similarly produced no
evidence that it held the note or acted as the agent of the noteholder.
5
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1 IV. Conclusion
2

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Order of the Bankruptcy Court entered

3 March 31, 2009 is AFFIRMED.
4I

DATED this 4th day of December 2009.

5
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"'
Kent J. Dawson
United States District Judge

EXHIBIT
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UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES

Case Title:

Rickie Walker

Matter:

[52] - Objection to Claim of Citibank, N.A.,
Claim Number 5 [MLA-3] Filed by Debtor In
Possession Rickie Walker (npas)

Judge:
Courtroom Deputy:
Reporter:
Department:

Ronald H. Sargis
Janet Larson
Diamond Reporters

Case No ; 10-21656 - E - 11
Date:
5/20/10
Time:
10:30

APPEARANCES for:
Movant(s) :
Debtor(s) Attorney - Mitchell L. Abdallah
Respondents):
None

OBJECTION was:
Sustained
See Findings of fact and conclusions of law below
The court will issue a minute order.
Local Rule 3007-1 (c)(1) Motion - No Opposition Filed.
Proper Notice Provided. The Proof of Service filed on April 6,2010, states that the Motion and supporting
pleadings were served on respondent creditor, other parties in interest and Office of the United States
Trustee.
The court notes that the moving party filed the declaration and exhibits in this matter as one document This
is not the practice in the Bankruptcy Court. "Motions, notices, objections, responses, replies, declarations,
affidavits, other documentary evidence, memoranda of points and authorities, other supporting documents,
proofs of service, and related pleadings shall be filed as separate documents." Revised Guidelines for the
Preparation of Documents, paragraph(3)(a). Counsel is reminded of the court's expectation that documents
filed with this court comply with the Revised Guidelines for the Preparation of Documents in Appendix II of
the Local Rules and that attorneys practicing in federal court comply with the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure.
NOTICE
FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE GUIDELINES AND
FILING PLEADINGS WHICH DO NOT COMPLY WITH THE
FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE SHALL RESULT
IN THE MOTION BEING SUMMARILY DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
This Objection to a Proof of Claim has been set for hearing on the notice required by Local Bankruptcy
Rule 3007- 1(c)(1). The failure of the Trustee and the respondent creditor to file written opposition at least
14 days prior to the hearing as required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 3007-1(c)(1)(l) is considered as consent
to the granting of the motion. Cf. Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9th Cir. 1995).
The court's decision is to sustain the Objection to the Proof of Claim and disallow the claim in its entirety
with leave for the owner of the promissory note to file a claim by June 18,2010. Oral argument may be

resented by the parties at the scheduled hearing, where the parties shall address the issues identified in
this tentative ruling and such other issues as are necessary and appropriate to the court's resolution of the
matter. If the court's tentative ruling becomes its final ruling, the court will make the followingfindingsof fact
and conclusions of law:
The Proof of Claim at issue, listed as claim number 5 on the court's official claims registry, asserts a
$1,320,650.52 secured claim. The Debtor objects to the Claim on the basis that the claimant, Citibank,
N.A., did not provided any evidence that Citibank has the authority to bring the claim, as required by
Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 3001(c), rendering the claim facially defective.
The court's review of the claim shows that the Deed of Trust purports to have been assigned to Citibank,
N.A. by Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. as nominee for Bayrock Mortgage Corporation on
March 5,2010. (Proof of Claim No. 5 p.36-37, Mar. 19,2010.) Debtor contends that this does not establish
that Citibank is the owner of the underling promissory note since the assignor, Mortgage Electronic
Registration Systems, Inc. ("MERS"), had no interest in the note to transfer. Debtors loan was originated by
Bayrock Mortgage Corporation and no evidence of the current owner of the promissory note is attached to
the proof of claim. It is well established law in the Ninth Circuit that the assignment of a trust deed does not
assign the underlying promissory note andrightto be paid, and that the security interest is incident of the
debt. 4 Witkin Summary of California Law, Secured Transactions in Real Property §105 (10th ed).
MERS AND CITIBANK ARE NOT THE REAL PARTIES IN INTEREST
Under California law, to perfect the transfer of mortgage paper as collateral the owner should physically
deliver the note to the transferee. Bear v. Golden Plan of California, Inc., 829 F.2d 705,709 (9th Cir. 1986).
Without physical transfer, the sale of the note could be invalid as a fraudulent conveyance, Cal. Civ. Code
§3440, or as unperfected, Cal. Com. Code §§9313-9314. See Roger Bernhardt, California Mortgages and
Deeds of Trusts, and Foreclosure Litigation §1.26 (4th ed. 2009). The note here specifically identified the
party to whom it was payable, Bayrock Mortgage Corporation, and the note therefore cannot be transferred
unless the note is endorsed. See Cal. Com. Code §§3109, 3201, 3203, 3204. The attachments to the claim
do not establish that Bayrock Mortgage Corporation endorsed and sold the note to any other party.
TRANSFER OF AN INTEREST IN THE DEED OF TRUST ALONE IS VOID
MERS acted only as a "nominee" for Bayrock Mortgage under the Deed of Trust. Since no evidence has
been offered that the promissory note has been transferred, MERS could only transfer what ever interest it
had in the Deed of Trust. However, the promissory note and the Deed of Trust are inseparable. "The note
and the mortgage are inseparable; the former as essential, the later as an incident. An assignment of the
note carries the mortgage with it, while an assignment of the latter alone is a nullity." Carpenter v. Longan,
83 U.S. 271, 274 (1872); accord Henley v. Hotaling, 41 Cal. 22, 28 (1871); Seidell v. Tuxedo Land Co., 216
Cal. 165,170 (1932); Cal. Civ. Code §2936. Therefore, if on party receives the note an another receives
the deed of trust the holder of the note prevails regardless of the order in which the interests were
transferred. Adler v. Sargent, 109 Cal. 42, 49-50 (1895).
Further, several courts have acknowledged that MERS is not the owner of the underlying note and
therefore could not transfer the note, the beneficial interest in the deed of trust, or foreclose upon the
property secured by the deed. See In re Foreclosure Cases, 521 F. Supp. 2d 650,653 (S.D. Oh. 2007); In
re Vargas, 396 B.R. 511, 520 (Bankr. C D . Cal. 2008); Landmark Nafl Bank v. Kesler, 216 P.3d 158 (Kan.
2009); LaSalle Bank v. Lamy, 824 N.Y.S.2d 769 (N.Y. Sup. C I 2006). Since no evidence of MERS'
ownership of the underlying note has been offered, and other courts have concluded that MERS does not
own the underlying notes, this court is convinced that MERS had no interest it could transfer to Citibank.
Since MERS did not own the underling note, it could not transfer the beneficial interest of the Deed of Trust
to another. Any attempt to transfer the beneficial interest of a trust deed with out ownership of the
underlying note is void under California law. Therefore Citibank has not established that it is entitled to
assert a claim in this case.
MULTIPLE CLAIMS TO THE BENEFICIAL INTEREST IN THE DEED OF TRUST AND OWNERSHIP OF
PROMISSORY NOTE SECURED THEREBY
Debtor also points out that four separate entities have claimed beneficial ownership of the deed of trust
(Obj. to Claim 3-5, Apr. 6, 2010.) The true owner of the underling promissory note needs to step forward to
settle the cloud that has been created surrounding the relevant parties rights and interests under the trust
deed.
DECISION

11 U.S.C. §502(a) provides that a claim supported by a Proof of Claim is allowed unless a party in interest
objects. Once an objection has been filed, the court may determine the amount of the claim after a noticed
hearing. 11 U.S.C. §502(b). Since the claimant, Citibank, has not established that it is the owner of the
promissory note secured by the trust deed, Citibank is unable to assert a claim for payment in this case.
The objection is sustained and Claim Number 5 on the court's official register is disallowed in its entirety,
with leave for the owner of the promissory note to file a claim in this case by June 18, 2010.
The court disallowing the proof of claim does not alter or modify the trust deed or the fact that someone has
an interest in the property which can be subject thereto. The order disallowing the proof of claim shall
expressly so provide.
The court shall issue a minute order consistent with this ruling.

EXHIBIT
"D"

NOT FOR PUBUCATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE COMMITTEE ON OPINIONS
BANK OF NEW YORK, as Trustee for
Home Mortgage Investment Trust
2004-4 Mortgage-Backed Notes,
Series 2004-4

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
CHANCERY DIVISION
ATLANTIC COUNTY
DOCKET NO: F-7356-09

Plaintiffs),
Civil Action
vs.
MICHAEL J. RAFTOGIANIS, his/her
heirs, devisees and personal
representatives, and his, her, their or
any of their successors in right, title
and interest, ROMAN J. KRYWOPUSK,
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This opinion deals with the plaintiffs right to proceed with an action to foreclose
a mortgage which secures a debt evidenced by a negotiable note. The original lender
elected to use the Mortgage Electronic Registration System in recording the mortgage by
designating that entity, as its nominee, as the mortgagee. The note and mortgage were
subsequently securitized, without notice to the borrower. This action to foreclose the
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mortgage wasfiledyears later, in the name of an entity created as a part of the
securitization process. The defendant/borrower challenged plaintiff's right to proceed
with the foreclosure. That challenge,framedas a dispute over "standing," has given rise
to a variety of factual and legal issues typically raised in this type of litigation.
Ultimately, the questions presented were whether plaintiff could establish its right to
enforce the obligation evidenced by the note and whether it must establish that it held that
right at the time the complaint was filed. The answers to those questions require an
understanding of the provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, the Mortgage
Electronic Registration System, the securitization of mortgages and how foreclosure
litigation is handled. This opinion addresses those disputes. Ultimately, the court
concluded that it was appropriate to require plaintiff to establish that it had physical
possession of the note as of the date the complaint was filed. Plaintiff was unable to
establish that, either by motion or at trial. Accordingly, the complaint has now been
dismissed on terms permitting plaintiff to institute a new action to foreclose, on the
condition that any new complaint must be accompanied by an appropriate certification,
confirming that plaintiff is then in possession of the note.
In this case, the defendant borrowed $1,380,000fromAmerican Home Mortgage
Acceptance Inc. (hereafter American Home Acceptance) in September 2004. This action
to foreclose the mortgage was brought in the name of The Bank of New York, as Trustee
for American Mortgage Investment Trust 2004-4 Mortgage Backed Notes, Series 2004-4
in February 2009. In the interim, a variety of transactions took place, involving a number
of entities. Those transactions will be discussed in some detail below. Preliminarily, this
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opinion will discuss the UCC, MERS and the securitization process in more general
terms.

THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
Mortgages provide security for the debtor's obligation to pay an underlying
obligation, ultimately permitting the mortgagee to force the sale of the property to satisfy
that obligation. As a general proposition, a party seeking to foreclose a mortgage must
own or control the underlying debt. See Gotlib v. Gotlib, 399 N.J. Super. 295 (App. Div.
2008); Garroch v. Sherman, 6 N J. Eq. 219 (Ch.1847); and Bellistri v. Ocwen Loan
Servicing, LLC, 284 S.W.3d. 619 (Mo. 2009). The debt itself is typically evidenced by
some other document. The manner in which one obtains control over the debt will depend
upon the nature of the underlying obligation.
Typically, the debt secured by a mortgage will be evidenced by a bond or a note.
Notes, in turn, may be negotiable or nonnegotiable. The handling of negotiable
instruments presents a variety of distinct issues, precisely because they are "negotiable."
Issues may be presented, in a variety of circumstances, as to just how interests in a
negotiable instrument can be transferred or "negotiated," and as to the rights and
responsibilities of those involved, including the original obligor, the original obligee and
third parties. Disputes over the handling of negotiable instruments can arise in a variety
of contexts.
Negotiable instruments, which include negotiable notes, are governed by Article
3 of the Uniform Commercial Code (hereafter, the UCC), codified in this state as
N.J.S.A. 12A:3-101, et seq. Checks, drafts and certificates of deposit are other forms of
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negotiable instruments which are subject to the UCC. There are specific provisions of the
UCC dealing with just who may enforce an instrument. One's ability to enforce an
instrument will depend on one's status, which in turn depends on what interests have
been acquired and just how those were acquired. In that context, it is often necessary to
determine whether the person seeking to enforce the note is a "holder" or has some other
status. How one becomes a holder will depend, at least in part, on the nature of the
instrument or note. Different rules apply to notes which are payable "to bearer" or "to
order." It is generally necessary to determine whether a negotiable note has effectively
been "transferred" and/or "negotiated."
As an aside, different issues may be presented when the debt is evidenced by a
bond or a nonnegotiable note. Nonnegotiable notes are transferred by "assignment" and
not by "negotiation," without reference to the provisions of the UCC dealing with
negotiable instruments. See 29 New Jersey Practice, Law of Mortgages 11.2 at 749
(Myron C. Weinstein) (2d ed. 2001) and 1 Nelson & Whitman, Real Estate Finance Law
5.28 (3d ed. 1993). Additional issues may also be presented where it is necessary to
determine whether one who is a holder is also a "holder in due course," which may affect
the defenses that can be asserted against the holder in an action to enforce the note.
Neither of those circumstances are presented here. In that context, this opinion focuses on
the plaintiffs right to enforce a negotiable note, without reference to its potential status
as a holder in due course.
A number of provisions of the UCC deal with the right to enforce negotiable
instruments. The issues presented here are dealt with most directly in N.J.S.A. 12A:3301. That section of the statute reads as follows:
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12A:3-301. Person entitled to enforce instrument
"Person entitled to enforce" an instrument means the holder
of the instrument, a nonholder in possession of the
instrument who has the rights of the holder, or a person not
in possession of the instrument who is entitled to enforce
the instrument pursuant to 12A:3-309 or subsection d. of
12A:3-418. A person may be a person entitled to enforce
the instrument even though the person is not the owner of
the instrument or is in wrongful possession of the
instrument.
The issue presented here is whether plaintiff was, at the appropriate time, either
"the holder of the instrument," or "a nonholder in possession of the instrument who has
the rights of the holder." (N.J.S.A. 12A:3-309 deals with the enforcement of instruments
which have been lost, destroyed or stolen. Subsection d. ofNJ.S.A. 12A:3-418 deals
with circumstances where an instrument has been paid or accepted by mistake and the
payor or acceptor recovers payment or revokes acceptance. Neither of those sections of
the statute apply here.) The resolution of that issue depends on the nature of the note and
just what was done with the note itself.
How does one become a holder of a negotiable note? In addressing that question
it is necessary to distinguish between "transfer" and "negotiation." It is also necessary to
distinguish between the handling of notes payable "to order" and notes payable "to
bearer." In this particular case, it is also necessary to recognize that a note initially made
payable "to order" can become a bearer instrument, if it is endorsed in blank. See
N.IS.A. 12A:3- 109(c), providing that an instrument payable to an identified person may
become payable to bearer if it is endorsed in blank. See also N.J.S.A. 12A:3~205(b).
describing what qualifies as a blank endorsement, and The Law of Modern Payment

5

Systems and Notes 2.02 at 77-78, Miller and Hanrell (2002), noting that an instrument
bearing the indorsement "Pay to the order of

" is a bearer instrument. Such a

bearer note can be both transferred and negotiated by delivery alone. See Corporacion
Venezolana de Fomento v. Vintero Sales. 452 F. Supp. 1108, 1117 (Dist Ct 1978).
Under the UCC, the transfer of an instrument requires that it be delivered for the
purpose of giving the person receiving the instrument therightto enforce it. A negotiable
note can be transferred without being negotiated. That transfer would be effected by the
physical delivery of the note. See NJ.S.A. 12A:3»203(a). In that cfrcumstance, the
transferee would not be a holder, as that term is used in the UCC. Such a transferee,
however, would still have the right to enforce the note. The UCC deals with that
circumstance in the following language:

Transfer of an instrument, whether or not the transfer is a
negotiation, vests in the transferee any right of the
transferor to enforce the instrument, including any right as
a holder in due course, but the transferee cannot acquire
rights of a holder in due course by a transfer, directly or
indirectly, from a holder in due course if the transferee
engaged infraudor illegality affecting the instrument.
NJ.S.A. 12A:3-203(b).
The negotiation of the instrument, on the other hand, requires both a transfer of
possession and an endorsement by the holder. An instrument which is payable to bearer
may be negotiated by transfer alone. Put otherwise, an instrument payable "to order" can
be negotiated by delivery with an endorsement, while an instrument payable "to bearer"
can be negotiated by delivery alone. NJ.S.A. 12A:3-201. To enforce the note at issue
here as a holder pursuant to NJ.S.A. 12A:3-301, plaintiff would have to establish that it
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received the note, through negotiation, at the appropriate time. That would require that
the note be endorsed prior to or at the time of delivery, either in favor of plaintiff or in
blank.
NJ.S.A. 12A:3-301 also provides that an instrument may be enforced by "a non
holder in possession of the instrument who has the rights of a holder." How does one
obtain that status? That may occur, by example, where a creditor of a holder acquires an
instrument through execution. See The Law of Modem Payment Systems and Notes 3.01
Miller and Harrell (2002). Morefrequently,that status will be created by the "transfer"
of the instrument, without negotiation. As already noted, transfer occurs when the
instrument is delivered for the purpose of giving the person receiving the instrument the
right to enforce it. See NJ.S.A. 12A:3-203(a). The statute also provides that the transfer
of the instrument, without negotiation, vests in the transferee the transferor's right to
enforce the instrument. See NJ.S.A. 12A:3-203(b). That circumstance can be illustrated
by reference to the dispute presented here. The note at issue, as originally drafted, was
payable "to the order of the original lender. The negotiation of the note, in that form,
would require endorsement, either to a designated recipient of the note or in blank. The
note, however, could be transferred without an endorsement. Assuming the transfer was
for the purpose of giving the recipient the ability to enforce the note, the recipient would
become a "nonholder in possession with the rights of a holder." That would require,
however, the physical delivery of the note. A number of cases recognize that there can be
constructive delivery or possession, through the delivery of the instrument to an agent of
the owner. See Midfirst Bank, SSB v. C.W. Havnes & Company, 893 F. Supp. 1304,
1314-1315 (S.C. 1994); Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. v. Linn, 671 F. Supp. 547, 553
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(N.D, 111. 1987); and Corporation Venezolana de Fomento v. Vintero Sales Corp, 452 F.
Supp, 1108,1117(SJD.N.Y. 1978).
Under either of the provisions ofNJ.S.A.12A:3-301 which are at issue here, the
person seeking to enforce the note must have possession. That is required to be a holder,
and to be a nonholder in possession with the rights of a holder. The application of the
provisions of the UCC to the dispute presented here will be discussed below.

MERS
The Mortgage Electronic Registration System (hereafter, MERS), is a unique
entity. Its involvement in the foreclosure process has been the subject of a substantial
amount of litigation throughout the country, resulting in the issuance of a number of
reported opinions. Recently, MERS was the focus of a decision of the Supreme Court: of
Kansas, reported as Landmark National Bank v. Kesler, 289 Kan. 528,216 P.3d. 158
(Kan, 2009) which is now cited frequently in this court. That opinion reviews the manner
in which MERS functions, the potential problems it can create, and some of the
competing policy issues presented. The opinion also cites a variety of published opinions
from around the country, addressing those same issues.
In essence, MERS is a private corporation which administers a national electronic
registry which tracks the transfer of ownership interests and servicing rights in mortgage
loans. Lenders participate as members of the MERS system. When mortgage loans are
initially placed, the lenders will retain the underlying notes but can arrange for MERS to
be designated as the mortgagees on the mortgages which become a part of the public
record. In that context, the lenders are able to transfer their interests to others, without
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having to record those subsequent transactions in the public record. See Mortgage Elec,
Reg. Svs. Inc. v. Nebraska Depart. Of Banking, 270 Neb, 529, 530,704 N.W.2d 784
(2005), cited in Landmark. The process is apparently cost efficient, from the perspective
of the lenders. Among other things, the use of MERS permits lenders to avoid the
payment offilingfees that might otherwise be required with the filing of multiple
assignments. By the same token, it can make it difficult for mortgagors and others to
identify the individual or entity which actually controls the debt at any specific time. See
Landmark, 216 P.3& at 168. On occasion, foreclosure actions are also brought in the
name of MERS. When MERS is involved, defendant/borrowers often argue there has
been a "separation" of the note and mortgage impacting on the plaintiffs ability to
proceed with the foreclosure. That argument has been raised here and will also be
addressed below.

SECURITIZATION
This case also involves the securitization of mortgage loans, a practice which is
facilitated by the MERS system. Trial courts in this state regularly deal with the
foreclosure of mortgages which have previously been securitized. Generally, one or more
lenders will sell substantial numbers of mortgage loans they have issued to a pool or trust.
Interests in that pool or trust are then sold to individual investors, who receive certificates
entitling them to share in the funds received as the underlying loans are repaid. That can
occur without any notice to the debtors/mortgagors who remain obligated on the original
notes. Other entities, generally called "servicers," are retained to administer the
underlying loans. Those servicers or additional "subservicers" will be responsible for
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collecting and distributing the funds which are duefromthe debtors/mortgagors. Many
are given the authority to institute and prosecute foreclosure proceedings.
The securitization of mortgages has a long and somewhat involved history in this
country, dating back to the nineteenth century. More recently, the federal government
became involved in various forms of securitization through the Federal National
Mortgage Asssociation (FNMA, or "Fannie Mae) and the Government National
Mortgage Association (GNMA or "Ginnie Mae). Private institutions became more
involved in securitization of mortgages beginning in the 1970s. Over time the stracturing
and issuance of private mortgage based securities became much more complex and
widespread, contributing to the recent crisis in thefinancialmarkets. For a detailed
analysis of the history of securitization, the role of pricing models, risk- and termpartitioned securities, and rating agencies, see Christopher L. Peterson, Predatory
Structured Finance, 28 Cardozo L. Rev. 2185 (April 2007).
The securitization of mortgages also presents competing policy concerns. The
securitization of mortgage debt facilitates the investment of funds from various sources
into a pool or trust. That in turn presumably provides additional sources of funds to
support mortgage lending. By the same token, the relationship between the holder of the
debt and the debtor/mortgagor becomes more attenuated and potentially confusing. That
can be particularly problematic when a matter proceeds to foreclosure, when substantial
issues may be presented as to the propriety of some type of forbearance, loan
modification or the forced sale of mortgaged property. Additional problems can be
presented in those circumstances where a borrower may have potential claims against
those involved in making the original loan. At least one commentator has suggested that
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securitization has placed substantial limitations on attempts to remedy or regulate
predatory lending practices. See Predatory Structured Finance, cited above.
As noted, this case involves both MERS and the securitization of the underlying
debt. Each of those circumstances can operate independently. Lenders who participate
in the MERS system may not be involved in the securitization of their mortgage loans.
Similarly, lenders may elect to securitize their mortgage loans without participating in the
MERS system. When each circumstance is involved, however, the potential for
confusion increases.
It is in that context that it is necessary to address the disputes raised by defendant
here as to plaintiff's right to proceed with the foreclosure. Preliminarily, it is appropriate
to review the underlying transactions.

DEFENDANT'S LOAN
The property at issue in this matter was purchased by defendants in September
2004. That purchase was funded, at least in part, by a loan from American Home
Acceptance in the amount of $1,380,000. Title was apparently taken in the name of
defendant Krywopusk and defendant Raftogianis. The loan closed on or about September
30,2004, which is presumably the date on which title was transferred to defendants.
Defendant Raftogianis executed a note in the amount just noted, payable to American
Home Acceptance. The note provided for interest, at a rate which was subject to
adjustment over time. Payments of interest and principal were due on a monthly basis, for
a period of approximately thirty years, thefirstmonthly payment being due November 1,
2004. On September 30, 2004, defendant Krywopusk and defendant Raftogianis each
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executed a mortgage encumbering Ihe property, to secure the note, A definitional section
of the mortgage describes the "Lender" as American Home Acceptance. The same
section of the mortgage refers to MERS as "a separate corporation that is acting solely as
a nominee for Lender and Lender's successors and assigns." The mortgagee, as
described in the mortgage itself, is MERS, "as nominee for the Lender." The mortgage
was recorded with the Atlantic County Clerk on October 20,2004. Defendants defaulted
on the payments required under the note in October 2008.
The note executed by defendant Raftogianis is clearly a negotiable instrument as
that term is defined by the UCC, In the terms of the statute, the note is payable to bearer
or to order, and it is payable on demand or at a definite time. While the note contains
detailed provisions as to just how payment is to be made, it does not state any other
undertaking or instruction by the person promising or ordering payment to do any act in
addition to the payment of money. See NJ.S.A. 12A:3-104. The note recites that
defendant Raftogianis "promises to pay U.S. $1,380,000.00 ... plus interest, to the order
of the Lender," then referring to "the Lender" as American Home Acceptance, beginning
with payments due in November 2004. See NJ.S.A. 12A:3-104(a)(l), (2) and (3).
This note, as originally drafted, was payable "to order." At some point, however,
the note was indorsed in blank. The original note was produced at oral argument on the
motion for summary judgment. It contained the following indorsement:
WITHOUT RECOURSE
BY AMERICAN HOME MORTAGE ACCEPTANCE, INC.

RENEEBURY
ASST. SECRETARY
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Ms. Bury's original signature was just above her printed name in that
indorsement. Defendant had signed the note on September 30, 2004, payable to the order
of American Home Acceptance. In that form the note could be transferred by delivery,
but could only be negotiated by indorsement. The indorsement in blank, however, would
effectively make the note payable "to bearer," permitting it to be transferred and
negotiated by delivery alone, without any additional indorsement.
While it was clear the note had been indorsed prior to the time it was presented to
the court, presumably as a part of the securitization process, it was not clear just when
that occurred, or when the note had been physically transferred from American Home
Acceptance to some other individual or entity.

THE SECURITIZATION OF THE LOAN
In or about December 2004, a group of mortgage loans held by American Home
Acceptance were securitized. While the court is now satisfied that defendants' loan was
among that group of loans securitized, that was not at all clearfromthe documents
initially submitted by plaintiff, as will be discussed below. The securitization of the loan
was not referenced in the complaint, or even in plaintiffs initial motion for summary
judgment. (Judges and lawyers who regularly handle foreclosure litigation would
probably recognize that the matter involved a loan which had been securitized just from
the description of plaintiff in the complaint, as "The Bank of New York, as Trustee for
American Mortgage Investment Trust 2004-4 Mortgage Backed Notes, Series 2004-4.
There is no apparent reason, however, why a layperson not familiar with the
securitization process would recognize that.) The materials which were ultimately
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presented, however, did document the process by which the mortgage loans were
securitized.
The documents provided in this case are typical of those presented in other
matters involving the securitization of mortgage loans. Those documents are lengthy,
complex and difficult to xmderstand. Included in the materials ultimately provided was a
Mortgage Loan Purchase Agreement, an Amended and Restated Trust Agreement, an
Indenture, and a Servicing Agreement. (The Indenture in this case is in excess of 100
pages, without attachments. An attachment which simply defines the terms used in the
Indenture itself contains 55 pages.) Much of that complexity in those documents relates
to the interests held by those who invest in the securitized loans, and how the Trust is
structured and administered. The transfers or assignments of the underlying mortgage
loans involve other comple?dties.
Defendants' original lender was American Home Acceptance. Under the terms of
the Mortgage Loan Purchase Agreement, American Home Acceptance, as seller, sold its
interests in a group of mortgage loans to American Home Mortgage Securities LLC
(hereafter American Home Securities), as purchaser. The Mortgage Loan Purchase
Agreement contemplates an additional transfer of those mortgage loans by American
Home Securities to the Trust. It also refers to The Bank of New York as Indenture
Trustee for the Trust.
The Amended and Restated Trust Agreement provides for the creation of the
Trust itself, apparently amending a prior Trust Agreement. That Amended and Restated
Trust Agreement involves three primary parties—American Home Securities (the
Depositor), Wilmington Trust Company (the Owner Trustee), and The Bank of New
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York (the Indenture Trustee). One portion of the Trust Agreement recites that the
Depositor does thereby transfer its right, title and interest in the mortgage loans to the
Trust. Another section of the Trust Agreement reflects the Owner Trustee's
acknowledgement of receipt of the mortgage loans. See Sections 3.01 and 2.05 of the
Trust Agreement. Another section of the Trust Agreement notes that the mortgage loans
will be assigned to the Indenture Trustee, pursuant to the Indenture. See Section 2.08 of
the Trust Agreement.
The Indenture itself does provide for that additional transfer to The Bank of New
York as Indenture Trustee. There are two primary parties to the Indenture—the Trust
itself, described as the Issuer, and The Bank of New York, as Indenture Trustee. The
Indenture recites that the Issuer does grant to the Indenture Trustee all its right, title and
interest in the mortgage loans, as well as its rights under the Mortgage Loan Purchase
Agreement. The same portion of the Indenture contains the Indenture Trustee's
acceptance of the trust, "as trustee on behalf of the Holders of the Notes and the Insurer,"
referring to those who have invested in the securitized mortgages. See the Granting
Clause in the Indenture. In a subsequent portion of the Indenture, The Bank of New York,
as Indenture Trustee, covenants that it will establish an "Eligible Account" in which it
will deposit each remittance it receivesfromthe servicer with respect to the mortgage
loans. See Section 3.01 of the Indenture.
The Servicing Agreement confirms the arrangements for the servicing of the
mortgage loans. There are three primary parties to the Servicing Agreement—American
Home Mortgage Servicing Inc., described as the RMBS Master Servicer, the Trust as
Issuer, and The Bank of New York as Indenture Trustee. The Servicing Agreement
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specifically provides the servicer with the authority to proceed with foreclosures.
Notably, the same section of the Servicing Agreement authorizes the servicer to register
mortgage loans with MERS, and to cause a mortgage loan to be removed from
registration with MERS. See Section 3.01 of the Servicing Agreement.
The various documents noted were dated "as of December 21, 2004, suggesting
they may actually have been executed on some other date. Testimony was presented at
trial confirming that the documents were all executed on December 21,2004, the date of
the closing on the securitization of the loans.
It is apparent that the parties to the securitization did understand that some of the
loans being securitized were evidenced by negotiable notes. Several provisions deal with
the handling of the notes in very specific terms. Deutsche Bank National Trust Company
is identified as Custodian for the Indenture Trustee. The Mortgage Loan Purchase
Agreement provides that American Home Acceptance, as seller, acting on behalf of
American Home Securities, as purchaser, is to deliver and deposit the original mortgage
notes "endorsed without recourse to the order of the Indenture Trustee or in blank" to
Deutsche Bank, as Custodian, "on or before the closing date." The closing date is
identified elsewhere in the documents as December 24,2004. See Section 2.01 (b) of the
Mortgage Loan Purchase Agreement. In addition, the Indenture provides that the
Indenture Trustee is to cause the Custodian, as agent for the Indenture Trustee, to
acknowledge receipt of documents referred to in the Mortgage Loan Purchase
Agreement, which would include the mortgage notes. In short, the documents indicate
that the parties to the securitization process did intend that the mortgage notes being
securitized would be endorsed in favor of the Indenture Trustee or in blank, and would be
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held by Deutsche Bank as custodian, acting for the Indenture Trustee. The endorsement
appearing on the copy of the note provided by plaintiff in conjunction with the motion for
summary judgment is consistent with those documents. The actual delivery of the notes
to Deutsche Bank, as custodian, would presumably constitute constructive delivery to the
Indenture Trustee.
Separate questions are presented, however, as to whether the note was in fact
physically transferred to plaintiff, when that would have occurred and whether the note
had been endorsed prior to that time. Those are issues that would have to be addressed
before one could determine whether the plaintiff was a person entitled to enforce the note
pursuant to the UCC at any particular time.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY
THE MISSING LOAN SCHEDULE
The original complaint in this matter wasfiledin the name of The Bank of New
York, as Trustee for American Mortgage Investment Trust 2004-4 Mortgage-Backed
Notes, Series 2004-4 on February 9,2009. It recited that plaintiff had become the owner
of the note and mortgage "before the within complaint was drafted." It does not refer to
the securitization of the loan, any of the entities involved in the securitization process, or
any transfer or assignment from either American Home Acceptance or MERS. The
complaint provided no information as to possession of the note.
Defendant Krywopusk filed an answer, counterclaim and crossclaim on May 6,
2009. Plaintiff, apparently unaware of thefilingof defendant's answer, filed an amended
complaint specifically reciting the execution and recording of an assignment from MERS.
That amended complaint was notfileduntil May 7, 2009.
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The assignmentfromMERS was executed and recorded a short time after the
complaint was filed. That document is dated February 18,2009. It is captioned
"Assignment of Mortgage." It recites that MERS, as nominee for American Home
Acceptance, transfers and assigns the mortgage at issue to Bank of New York, as Trustee.
The assignment refers to the mortgage as securing the note at issue. It recites the transfer
of the mortgage "together with all rights therein and thereto, all liens created or secured
thereby, all obligations therein described, the money due and to become due with interest,
and all rights accrued or to accrue under such mortgage," The assignment was executed
by one Linda Green, as Vice President of MERS, as nominee for American Home
Acceptance. Ms. Green's signature was notarized, The assignment was recorded with the
Atlantic County Clerk on February 24,2009. It does appear the assignment was intended
to indicate that the debt in question had been transferred to the Bank of New York as
Indenture Trustee in February 2009. It is now apparent that is not what occurred.
In any event, the matter proceeded in the vicinage based upon thefilingof
defendant's contesting answer. While discovery was permitted, the parties apparently
elected to forego any formal discovery.
Plaintiff filed its motion for summary judgment in January 2010. The motion was
based upon a certification from plaintiffs counsel providing copies of the note, the
mortgage and the February 2009 assignment. While the copy of the note provided with
the motion did contain the blank indorsement noted above, there was no information
provided as to when the note was indorsed, when the note was physically transferred, or
where the note was being held. Defendant filed written opposition, challenging the
validity of the MERS assignment. Plaintiff responded with a certification executed by a
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supervisor for American Home Mortgage Servicing, Inc., the servicer for the loans.
While that additional certification recited that the note and mortgage had previously been
sold to plaintiff, it did that in conclusory terms. No additional documentation was
provided. Neither plaintiffs motion nor plaintiff's reply to defendant's opposition
addressed the securitization of the debt, or the transfer or negotiation of the underlying
note. The court then required the production of the documents executed as a part of the
securitization process. The motion was adjourned
Plaintiff then provided three separate servicing agreements which had apparently
been entered into as a part of the securitization process. The servicing agreements were
not signed. The underlying documentation was not provided. The court again directed
that the underlying documentation be provided. The motion was adjourned again.
The additional documents were provided, with an affidavit executed by another
representative of the servicer. Those documents included the Amended and Restated
Trust Agreement, the Mortgage Loan Purchase Agreement, the Indenture and the
Servicing Agreement. While the copies provided were signed, schedules referenced in the
documents as listing the mortgage loans being securitized were not attached. For that
reason, there was no way to confirm that defendant's loan was among those which had
been securitized. The court again directed plaintiff to supplement its earlier submissions
with copies of the applicable schedules. The motion was adjourned again.
Plaintiffs counsel then advised that plaintiff was unable to obtain a copy of the
loan schedule at issue, noting that the lawfirmwhich had served as closing counsel when
the loans were securitized had dissolved, and that plaintiff did not have any other sources
which might be able to provide the schedule. In that same correspondence, plaintiff's
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counsel indicated that his office had requested that the original note be forwarded to it,
suggesting the original note could be presented at the time of argument on the motion.
Notably, that was the first time that plaintiff's representatives suggested plaintiff would
attempt to establish its right to proceed based on its possession of the note. See Mr.
Ford's letter of April 15, 2010. The court declined to adjourn the matter again. Argument
was conducted April 23,2010.
The day before the argument, plaintiffs counsel submitted yet another
certification, which appeared to contradict his prior submission. That certification was
executed by Glenn E. Mitchell, who described himself as Vice President of The Bank: of
New York, as Indenture Trustee. (Notably, that was the first certification executed by an
officer or employee of the plaintiff, as opposed to the servicer.) That certification
reviewed the underlying circumstanqes in some detail. Attached to the certification was a
redacted loan schedule, referred to in the certification as a "loan schedule for the Trust,"
The one entry appearing on the redacted schedule appears to list the loan at issue here. It
was unclear whether the schedule in question was in fact attached to one or more of the
underlying documents. There was no explanation for the apparent change in plaintiffs
circumstances, which permitted it to produce the schedule which was previously
unavailable.
Plaintiff's counsel did present the original note at the time of argument and
argued that the presentation of the original note alone, at that time, was sufficient to
establish plaintiffs right to proceed, That argument was rejected. The motion for
summary judgment was denied. A hearing was scheduled to address just how and when
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the note was transferred, and whether the plaintiff did have therightto enforce the note at
the time the complaint wasfiled.That hearing was conducted in June 2010.

LEGAL ANALYSIS
This is a dispute over plaintiffs right to proceed with the foreclosure. There are a
number of ways toframethe issue.
In the most general sense, defendant questioned whether plaintiff could establish
that it had, in fact, acquired the right to enforce the note and mortgage. Defendant
specifically challenged plaintiffs reliance on the February 2009 assignmentfromMERS,
arguing that MERS simply did not have the authority to assign the note, given the prior
"separation" of the note and mortgage. In responding to those challenges, plaintiff has
offered a variety of alternative bases for itsrightto proceed with the foreclosure. At
various times, plaintiff has argued that it has established itsrightto proceed based on: (1)
the February 2009 assignmentfromMERS alone; (2) the documents executed in or about
December 2004 evidencing an intention to transfer the debt to the Trust; and (3) its actual
possession of the note, endorsed in blank, as presented at argument on the motion for
summary judgment. Focusing on the UCC, plaintiff has argued that it is either a holder,
or a nonholder in possession with therightto enforce the note, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 12A:
3-301. At trial, plaintiff attempted to establish that it did have possession of the note as of
the date the original complaint was filed.
Obviously, there is a temporal component to the dispute. Plaintiff filed its
complaint for foreclosure in February 2009, alleging that it had become the owner of the
note and mortgage "before the complaint was filed," It then filed an amended complaint
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in May 2009, referring to the MERS assignment to plaintiff executed in February 2009,
suggesting it somehow obtained the right to proceed based on that assignment. By the
time motions for summary judgment were argued in April 2010, plaintiff was asserting a
right to proceed based on its actual possession of the note at the time the motions were
argued, without presenting any meaningful proofs as to the transfer or negotiation of the
note, or just when any transfer or negotiation occurred. The ultimate question is clear—is
this action now being prosecuted by one who does have the authority to enforce the
underlying obligation? The temporal question, however, is just as important- would it
be appropriate to permit the plaintiff to proceed with this action for foreclosure if it did
not have the right to enforce the note as of the date the complaint was filed?
The remainder of this opinion will address those legal and equitable issues,
focusing on the three claims asserted by plaintiff, noted above.

THE MERS ASSIGNMENT-THE SEPARATION
OF THE NOTE AND MORTGAGE
The facts presented here are typical. The lender agrees to lend monies to the
property owner, to be secured by a mortgage encumbering the property owner's real
estate. The property owner executes a note reflecting the obligation to repay the debt,
payable to the lender. The property owner also executes a mortgage securing the
obligation to repay the debt. The mortgage provides that the property is mortgaged and
conveyed to MERS as nominee for lender and the lender's successors and assigns. In
short, the note is payable to the lender, and the mortgage is in favor of MERS as nominee
for the lender. Defendant suggests that creates a "separation" of the note and mortgage,
restricting the ability to foreclose.
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Plaintiff's position is relatively simple. In essence, plaintiff indicates that the debt
in question—consisting of both the note and the mortgage—has been transferred to it,
that defendants have defaulted on their obligations under the note and mortgage, and that
plaintiff should be permitted to proceed through judgment and sale, enforcing its right to
look to the property to satisfy the debt. Defendant questions the accuracy and validity of
the documents presented by plaintiff, focusing on the alleged "separation" of the note and
mortgage as impacting on plaintiffs right to proceed. In large part, defendant relies on
case law indicating that a party seeking foreclosure must own or control the underlying
debt, and may not proceed based on his control of the mortgage alone. See, for example,
Gotlib v. Gotlib, 399 N.J. Super. 295 (App. Div. 2008); Garroch v. Sherman, 6 NJ. Eq.
219 (Ch. 1847); and Bellistri v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC. 284 S.W.3& 619 (Mo.
2009).
There are a number of components to defendant's argument based on the alleged
separation of the note and mortgage. Defendant argues that the note and mortgage were
originally held by separate entities- the note being held by American Home Acceptance
and the mortgage being held by MERS. It follows, defendant argues, that MERS held
only the mortgage and not the note, that MERS was not in a position to assign or transfer
the note to plaintiff, and that plaintiff therefore cannot have acquired the note. Without
the note, defendant argues, plaintiff does not have standing to proceed with the
foreclosure. The concepts underlying those arguments are not particularly controversial.
Obviously, the law recognizes the distinction between the debt itself and the pledging of
collateral to secure the debt. Logically, the right to enforce mortgage would have to be
based on ownership of the underlying debt.
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In most circumstances, a note and related mortgage will be held by the same
individual or entity. The obligors and obligees referenced on the note and mortgage will
generally be the same. Transfers or assignments would involve both instruments. It is
difficult to imagine circumstances where one would want to hold a mortgage, without
having the right to act on the underlying debt. By the same token, there is no technical
reason why the interests could not be separated in one way or another. Indeed, this case
does present one somewhat unusual circumstance related to the mortgaging of the
property—the note in this case was signed by defendant Raftogianis alone, while the
mortgage was signed by both defendant Raftogianis and defendant Krywopusk.
Defendant argues that the note and mortgage were "separated" when those
documents were first created, distinguishing between the designation of American Home
Acceptance as the payee on the note, and MERS, as nominee for American Home
Acceptance, as the mortgagee. The argument is creative, but not convincing. It ignores
the most basic circumstance presented. It should be obvious to anyone with any basic
understanding of the circumstances that there was no real intent to "separate" the note
and mortgage. The debt in question was clearly payable to American Home Acceptance.
The designation of MERS as nominee on the mortgage was simply intended to permit the
recording of the mortgage in a way that would facilitate subsequent transfers through
MERS without the recording of additional documents. One could debate the propriety
and efficacy of using MERS in terms of policy. It is clear, however, that there was no
real intent to separate ownership of the note and mortgage at the time those documents
were created.
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The issue isframed,at least in part, by the description of MERS as "nominee."
The use of that term, as it is used by MERS, was analyzed in some detail in the decision
of the Supreme Court of Kansas in Landmark, a case relied upon by defendant and cited
above. Landmark involved a property which was encumbered by two mortgages. The
loan provided by Landmark National Bank was secured by afirstmortgage payable to it.
There was a second mortgage on the property securing a loan that had been provided by
Millennia Mortgage Corp. Millennia was a participant in MERS. The second mortgage
securing the debt due Millennia was in the name of MERS "solely as nominee" for
Millennia. The Millennia mortgage was subsequently transfeired or assigned to
Sovereign Bank. That transfer was not reflected in the public record. Landmarkfiledan
action to foreclose its first mortgage naming Millennia, but neither MERS nor Sovereign
as defendants. No one responded on behalf of Millennia and the matter proceeded
through judgment and sale. Sovereign subsequently filed a motion to set aside the
judgment, arguing that MERS was a "contingently necessary party" under Kansas law.
The trial court concluded that MERS was not a real party in interest and denied the
motion to set aside the judgment. Both the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court of
Kansas affirmed, essentially concluding that MERS did not have any real interest in the
underlying debt. Notably, the opinion of the Supreme Court of Kansas recognizes the
potential for the separation of interests in a note and related mortgage. In that context, the
opinion addressed the use of the term "nominee" in some detail, as follows:
The legal status of a nominee, then, depends on the context
of the relationship of the nominee to its principal. Various
courts have interpreted the relationship of MERS and the
lender as an agency relationship. (Citation omitted)

25

The relationship that MERS has to Sovereign is more akin
to that of a straw man than to a party possessing all the
rights given a buyer. A mortgage and a lender have
intertwined rights that defy a clear separation of interests,
especially when such a purported separation relies on
ambiguous contractual language. The law generally
understands that a mortgagee is not distinct from a lender: a
mortgagee is "[o]ne to whom property is mortgaged: the
mortgage creditor, or lender.5' Black's Law Dictionary
1034 (8th ed. 2004). By statute, assignment of the mortgage
carries with it the assignment of the debt. K.S.A. 38-2323.
Although MERS asserts that, under some situations the
mortgage document purports to give it the same rights as
the lender, the document consistently refers only to rights
of the lender, including rights to receive notice of litigation
to collect payments, and to enforce the debt obligation.
The document consistently limits MERS to acting "solely"
as the nominee of lender.
289 Kan. 538-540.
While the Landmark court recognized that Issues might be raised as to an alleged
separation of a note and mortgage, it was not required to address those issues directly. Its
analysis of the role MERS plays as nominee, however, supports the conclusion reached
by this court with respect to that issue. MERS, as nominee, does not have any real
interest in the underlying debt, or the mortgage which secured that debt. It acts simply as
an agent or "straw man" for the lender. It is clear to this court that the provisions of the
mortgage describing the mortgagee as MERS "as nominee" were not intended to deprive
American Home Acceptance of its right to security under the mortgage or to separate the
note and mortgage.
It is a fundamental maxim of equity that "[ejquity looks to substance rather than
form." See Applestein v. United Board & Carton Corp.. 60 N J. Super. 333, 348 (Ch.
Div. 1960) aff d o.b., 33 NX 72 (1960). The courts have applied that principle in dealing
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with mortgages in a variety of contexts. So it is that an assignment of a bond or note
evidencing a secured obligation will operate as an assignment of the mortgage "in
equity." See 29 New Jersey Practice, Law of Mortgages 11.2, at 748 (Myron C.
Weinstein) (2d ed. 2001) (citing Stevenson v. Black 1 N.J. Eq. 338,343 (Ch. 1831) and
other cases). Conversely, commentators have noted the propriety of treating the
assignment of a mortgage, without a specific reference to the underlying obligation, as
effectively transferring both interests.

But it does not follow that an assignment in terms of the
"mortgage" without express reference to the secured
obligation is insufficient to transfer the obligation and is
therefore a nullity, as some courts have held. As Mr. Tiffany
long ago pointed out,
The question is properly one of the construction of
the language used, and in arriving at the proper
construction, evidence of the sense in which that
language is ordinarily used is of primary
importance. The expression "assignment of
mortgage" is almost universally used, not only by
the general public, but also by the Legislature, the
courts, and the legal profession, to describe the
transfer of the totality of the mortgagee's rights, that
is, his right to the debt as well as to the lien securing
it, and to hold, as these cases apparently do, that
when one in terms assigns a mortgage, he intends,
not an effective transfer of his lien alone, which is
an absolute nullity, not only ignores this ordinary
use of the term "mortgage", but is also in direct
contravention of the well recognized rule that an
instrument shall if possible be construed so as to
give it a legal operation.
See 29 New Jersey Practice, Law of Mortgages 11.2 at
754(Myron C, Weinstein)(2d ed.2001) (citing 5 Tiffany on
Real Property 428-29).
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It is apparent there was no real intention to separate the note and mortgage at the
time those documents were created. American Home Acceptance remained the owner of
both the note and mortgage through the date the loan was securitized. It did have the right
to transfer its interests when the loan was securitized.
It was entirely appropriate to argue that the February 2009 assignment from
MERS, as nominee for American Home Acceptance, to the Bank of New York, as
Trustee, was ineffective. From the court's perspective, that assignment was, at best, a
distraction. The actual transfers of interests in the note and mortgage occurred in different
ways. There was no reason, however, that plaintiff could not acquire the right to enforce
the note and mortgage through those other transactions. In that context, defendant's
attack on plaintiffs right to proceed based on the alleged separation of the note and
mortgage is rejected.

ENFORCEMENT WITHOUT POSSESSION—THE
REAL PARTY IN INTEREST ISSUE
Plaintiff also argues that it should be permitted to proceed based on the
documents presented by the time the motion was argued, without establishing that it had
possession of the note at the time the complaint wasfiled.That argument is inconsistent
with the provisions of the UCC dealing with the handling of negotiable instruments.
Here, as in other cases, plaintiff argued that it should be permitted to proceed because it is
a "real party in interest," noting that New Jersey's rules as to standing are liberal, that the
plaintiff has established it has some stake in the matter, and that the plaintiff should
therefore be permitted to proceed without the type of inquiry that would be appropriate
under the UCC. As is typical, plaintiffs counsel based that argument on the provisions
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of R 4:26-1, specifically arguing that under that Rule a party need only be a "real party
in interest" to have standing to proceed. See Mr. Ford's April 22,2010 Letter Brief. That
argument is misplaced.
R 4:26-1 does not say that any individual or entity which has some interest in a
matter has the authority to prosecute the claim. The Rule reads as follows:
Every action may be prosecuted in the name of the real
party in interest; but an executor, administrator, guardian of
a person or property, trustee of an express trust or a party
with whom or in whose name a contract has been made for
the benefit of another may sue in afiduciary'sown name
without joining the person for whose benefit the suit is
brought. A trustee of an express trust may be sued without
joining the beneficiaries of the trust unless it shall
affirmatively appear in the action that a conflict of interest
exists between the trustee and the beneficiaries.
The veryfirstportion of the Rule is permissive, providing that an action may be
prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest. That portion of the Rule appears to
contemplate that some actions may be brought in the name of someone other than the real
party in interest. The next portion of the Rule provides that certainfiduciariesmay bring
an action in their own names, presumably on behalf of the individuals or entities for
which they act, without joining those individuals or entities in the action. The Rule does
not suggest that an individual or entity which does not have afiduciaryrelationship with
the real party in interest is authorized to bring an action on behalf of that party, whether
or not that party is joined. The facts at issue here are illustrative. The complaint in this
matter wasfiledin the name of The Bank of New York, as the Indenture Trustee. That is
consistent with the Rule, assuming the action is proceeding on behalf of the Trust as the
real party in interest. In essence the Rule permitted the Bank to sue in its own name, on
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behalf of the Trust, without joining the Trust as a party. The problem presented here,
however, is more specific. Absent possession of the note, the Trust itself would not have
the authority to enforce the note or the mortgage under the UCC. It would have been
inappropriate for the matter to proceed in the name of the Trust or the Trustee until that
issue was resolved.
Our case law dealing with the issue of standing is fairly liberal. Classically,
standing requires that a litigant have a sufficient stake in the matter and real
adversariness, with a substantial potential for real harmflowingfrom the outcome of the
case. See N.J. Chamb. of Commerce v. N.J. Elec. Law Enforce. Comnou 82 N.J. 57, 67
(1980) and In re New Jersey Bd. Of Public Utilities, 200 N.J. Super. 544, 556 (App. Div.
1985). By the same token, litigants generally have no standing to assert the rights of third
parties. See Jersey Shore, Etc. v> Estate of Baum. 84 NJ. 137,144 (1980). This is an
action to foreclose a mortgage, not to obtain some general determination of the rights of
those involved. Obviously, there are any number of individuals and entities which have
an interest in the outcome of this litigation. Presumably that would include all those
involved in the securitization of the mortgage loans at issue, including the individual
investors. There is simply no reason to suggest, however, that the action to foreclose
could befiledby any of the individuals or entities involved in the securitization process.
In simple terms, this was a dispute over just who has the right to enforce the note
and the related mortgage. That dispute could not be resolved simply by identifying those
entities which had some general interest in the outcome of the litigation. It was entirely
appropriate to require plaintiff to establish it did have the right to enforce the note and
mortgage.
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THE RIGHT TO ENFORCEMENT—POSSESSION
OF THE NOTE AS OF THE DATE OF FILING
Plaintiff did produce the original note, indorsed in blank, at the time of argument
on its motion for summary judgment, approximately fourteen months after the complaint
was filed. It then argued that it should be permitted to proceed with the foreclosure based
on its current possession of the note, without establishing it had possession as of the date
the complaint wasfiled.That argument suggests a number of additional questions. Must
plaintiff establish that it held the right to enforce the note and mortgage as of the date the
complaint wasfiled?What should be done if plaintiff cannot establish it had the right to
enforce the note and mortgage at the time the complaint isfiledbut can establish it had
acquired that right at some subsequent time?
Obviously, a complaint to foreclose a mortgage should befiledby or on behalf of
the individual or entity which has the right to enforce the mortgage at the time of the
filing. That is clearly contemplated by the Rules of Court. See EL 4:64-l(b)(10)
providing that when the plaintiff is not the original mortgagee or the original nominee
mortgagee, the complaint must recite "all assignments in the chain of title." See also R.
4:34-3 dealing with the substitution of parties when interests are transferred during the
pendency of litigation. There are good reasons for that general rule.
For a variety of reasons, litigants facing foreclosure should be able to confirm that
a complaint is properlyfiledby an individual or entity with the authority to proceed. The
date offilingcan affect substantive rights, and those involved should have the ability to
confirm thatfilingwas proper. By way of example, the Fair Foreclosure Act, NJ.S.A.
2A:5G-53, et seq., provides that a debtor's right to cure a default with respect to a
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residential mortgage, without being responsible for the lender's fees and costs, will end
when the complaint is filed. See NJ.S.A. 2A:50~56(5), (6) and (7). Similarly, NJ.S.A.
46:10B-50 now provides that certain borrowers facing foreclosure have the right to a six
month forbearance, effective with thefilingof a foreclosure complaint. In any event, it
is generally appropriate for one who is seeking the court's assistance in forcing the sale
of property to proceed with some degree of transparency.
The issue can arise in a variety of contexts. The problem might be presented, as
here, in contested litigation. Contested litigation, in turn, might involve a variety of other
issues, apartfromthe question of standing. The problem can also arise in uncontested
matters, generally handled by the Office of Foreclosure. Is it appropriate for the Office of
Foreclosure to require proofs of the plaintiff's standing as of the date the original
complaint wasfiledas a condition of recommending the entry of final judgment? More
importantly, what remedy is appropriate? Should a plaintiff that did not have the
authority to proceed as of the date the complaint wasfiledbe permitted to remedy that
problem byfilingan amended complaint? Would the availability of that remedy depend
on whether defendant had filed a responsive pleading or motion to dismiss prior to the
time any amended complaint wasfiled?Alternatively, should the defective complaint be
subject to dismissal, presumably on terms permitting thefilingof a new complaint by one
with the authority to proceed as of the date of the newfiling?Is the remedy dependent on
the circumstances of the particular case at issue? Those issues are not easily resolved.
While the Rules of Court do not deal with the matter directly, the courts have had
occasion to address the general problem in a number of different contexts.
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There is one opinion which does deal with the issue directly, in the context of
foreclosure litigation filed in federal court based on diversity jurisdiction. In re
Foreclosure Cases, 521 F. Supp. 2d 650 (U.S. Dist. 2007) involved a dispute over
standing and subject matter jurisdiction. The United States District Court concluded that
to satisfy Article El's standing requirements the plaintiff in a foreclosure action must
establish that it was the holder of the note and the mortgage at the time the complaint was
filed. That issue was not clearly resolved on the record presented at the time. The
plaintiffs were given 30 days to submit proofs that they did have standing and that the
federal court had diversity jurisdiction as of the date the complaint was filed. If that was
not done, the complaints at issue were to be dismissed without prejudice to refiling if and
when the plaintiff acquired standing and when the diversity requirements were met. See
In re Foreclosure Cases, 521 F. Supp. 2d at 654. That result is consistent with this court's
analysis of the issue.
There are no New Jersey cases dealing directly with the issue. There are,
however, several New Jersey cases which highlight the tension presented in determining
just what alternative remedy would be appropriate in these circumstances. Under the Fair
Foreclosure Act, a lender which intends to foreclose a residential mortgage is required to
serve what is commonly referred to as a Notice of Intention on the mortgage debtor at
least thirty days before an action isfiled.The borrower is given the right to cure any
existing default, without the payment of the lender's fees and costs, during that interim
period. See NJ.S.A. 2A:50-56 and N.J.S.A. 2A:50~57. A number of reported opinions
have addressed the question of just what remedy is appropriate when some defect in
service of the Notice of Intention is discovered after the complaint is filed. Generally, the
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question is whether the complaint should be dismissed, or whether the lender should be
permitted to proceed on terms permitting the service of a new notice, to be given effect in
the pending action, on terms permitting a cure as if the complaint had not yet been filed.
The courts have dealt with that dispute in different ways. In GE Capital Mortgage Servs.,
Inc. v. Weisman, 329 N. J.Super. 590 (Ch. Div. 2000) the court permitted a lender which
was unable to locate records which presumably may have established service of the
Notice of Intention to cure that problem with the service of a new Notice, without the
filing of a new action. The Appellate Division appears to have adopted that type of
remedy in Cho Hung Bank v. Kim, 361 NJ. Super. 331 (App. Div. 2003), a case
involving apparent deficiencies within a Notice of Intention that had been served, and a
dispute over whether the statute was applicable to that dispute. In that case, the Appellate
Division authorized the service of a new Notice, without the dismissal of the underlying
action. In EMC Mortg. Corp. v. Chaudri, 400 NJ. Super. 126 (App. Div. 2008), however,
another panel of the Appellate Division subsequently disapproved of that remedy,
essentially concluding that the underlying legislation required the dismissal of the
complaint.
The opinion in Marshall v. Raritan Valley Disp., 398 NJ. Super. 168 (App. Div.
2008) deals with a similar problem, but in an entirely different context. Marshall was a
personal injury action involving multiple defendants and disputes over insurance
coverage. The defendant Township of West Amwell was insured under two separate
insurance policies. The Public Alliance Insurance Coverage Fund (PAIC) was one of
those carriers. PAIC defended the action on behalf of West Amwell. In those
proceedings, a third party action wasfiledby West .Amwell against Illinois National, the
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second carrier. PAIC settled the underlying claim. Illinois National then challenged
West Amwell's standing to the coverage action, essentially arguing that PAIC, and not
West Amwell, was then the real party in interest. The trial court recognized that PAIC
was the real party in interest, but rejected that argument that the action had to be
maintained in the name of PAIC, ultimately entering judgment against Illinois National.
The Appellate Division reversed,findingthat West Amwell did not have standing to
pursue the coverage dispute once PAIC had paid the claim. It then addressed the
question of whether the third party complaint should be dismissed, or whether the matter
could proceed through the substitution of PAIC as the third-party plaintiff. The Appellate
Division's analysis focused on the provisions of EL 4:34-3 which provides that where
there has been a transfer of interest, the action may proceed by or against the original
party, unless the court directs a substitution. The Appellate Division permitted that matter
to proceed through a substitution, but noted the court had substantial discretion in
implementing the Rule. Those issues were addressed in the following language.
This view of the federal counterpart to Rule 4:34-3 could
support the conclusion that the substitution of PAIC for
West Amwell as third-party plaintiff is not authorized by
Rule 4:34-3 because of the previously discussed differences
between West Amwell's and PAIC's coverage claims
against Illinois National. However, both the trial court and
the parties have already invested substantial time and
resources in adjudicating those claims. Moreover, both of
West Amwell's and PAIC's claims derive from the same
coverage provisions of the Illinois National Policy and, like
its federal counterpart and the predecessor New Jersey
court rule, Rule 4:34-4 vests substantial discretion in the
court to determine whether substitution would be
appropriate under the circumstances of a partitular case.
See Morris M.Schnitzer & Julius Wildstein, New Jersey
Rules Service: 1954 to 1967. comment 7 on RJL 4:38-3.
Therefore, we conclude that the interests of efficient
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judicial administration would be served by allowing PAIC
to substitute for West Amwell as the third-party plaintiff
rather than requiring PAIC to file a separate action against
Illinois National.
Marshall 398 NJ. Super at 180-181.

This court is not convinced the provisions of R. 4:34-3 were intended to apply to
the circxmistances presented here. The problem presented here did not relate to a transfer
of interestsfromthe plaintiff identified in the complaint to some other entity, after the
complaint was filed. The issue here is whether the plaintiff identified in the complaint
was the proper party at the time the complaint was filed. Nevertheless, the type of
analysis suggested by the opinion in Marshall appears appropriate here. Where the
plaintiff did not have the right to proceed as of the date of the initialfiling,dismissal may
be an appropriate remedy. The propriety of that remedy, however, will have to be
addressed on a case by case basis. One focus of any analysis would be the time and
effort devoted to the prior litigation, and the amount of duplication of effort that might be
required if a new action isfiled,both on the part of the parties and the court.
As a routine matter, any complaint for foreclosure should be filed in the name of
the individual or entity with the authority to enforce the underlying debt. In actions
involving a negotiable note, plaintiff should generally be in a position to establish that it
did have possession of the note as of the date the complaint wasfiledas required by the
UCC. Where that cannot be established, the complaint may be subject to dismissal,
without prejudice to the filing of a new action. There is simply no reason for this court to
disregard the substantive provisions of the UCC. Equity follows the law. See Dunkin'
Donuts of America Inc. v. Middletown Donut Corp., 100 K I 166, 183-185 (1985).
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Whether any particular action should in fact be dismissed should be addressed on
a case to case basis, dependent upon all the circumstances. As a general matter, dismissal
will probably be appropriate, if only to provide a clear incentive to plaintiffs to see that
the issue of standing is properly addressed before any complaint isfiled.There maybe
cases, however, where dismissal would not be appropriate. That may be the case if the
defendant fails to raise the issue promptly, or when substantial time and effort may have
been devoted to addressing other matters that would then have to be revisited in any new
litigation. Those circumstances were not presented here. Defendant did raise the standing
issue promptly. The parties were not required to litigate other issues. Plaintiffs right to
proceed turned on plaintiff's ability to establish that it did have possession of the note at
the time the original complaint wasfiled.That issue was ultimately addressed at trial.

TRIAL—PROOF OF POSSESSION,
PRESUMPTIONS
Trial was conducted to address the standing issue in June 2010. Plaintiff
presented the testimony of Mr. Mitchell, a Vice President of The Bank of New York,
whose certification had been submitted in support of the prior motion. No other
witnesses were presented by either party. Mr. Mitchell had been employed by The Bank
of New York since sometime in 2002. He had been involved in the securitization of the
American Home Acceptance mortgage loans at issue. He confirmed that he did attend
the closing on the loans at issue, that the closing did occur December 21, 2004, and that
he was the individual who signed the documents at issue for The Bank of New York at
that closing. He was also able to identify a Mortgage Loan Schedule maintained by The
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Bank of New York with respect to the particular securitization at issue, which did refer to
the specific loan at issue here. He was unable, however, to confirm that the Mortgage
Loan Schedule he produced would have been the same as any of the various Schedules
referred to in either the Mortgage Loan Purchase Agreement, the Indenture or a separate
Custodial Agreement referred to in other documentation. Indeed, the form of the
Schedule did not appear to provide the information that was to be referenced in the
Schedule which was to accompany the Indenture, which presumably would have been the
Schedule available to The Bank of New York. Mr. Mitchell did confirm that The Bank of
New York considered the loan at issue here to be an asset of the Trustfromthe time of
the original securitization in 2004. He also confirmed it was an industry practice to have
the documents involved reviewed over a period of months prior to any actual closing.
Notably, Mr. Mitchell's testimony indicated that approximately 11,000 loans had been
securitized as a part of this process.
Mr. Mitchell was unable to offer any direct proof as to the physical transfer of the
note at issue in this matter. The securitization documents did indicate that American
Home Securities, as Seller, was to deliver a variety of documents related to individual
mortgage loans to Deutsche Bank, as Custodian, which were then to be reviewed by the
Custodian as a part of the securitization process. The documents to be reviewed were to
include the original mortgage notes, with appropriate endorsements. See Section 2.03 of
the Indenture providing for a review to be completed no later than 180 days after the
closing, and Section 2.01(b)(i) to (vi) of the Mortgage Loan Purchase Agreement,
identifying the documents which were to be deposited and reviewed. It was apparently
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intended that the notes would be delivered to Deutsche Bank in appropriate form, and
that Deutsche Bank would confirm that had been done.
Mr. Mitchell, however, was not in a position to testify as to what had actually
occurred. Deutsche Bank's operations were apparently handled in a separate facility, far
from Mr. Mitchell's office. Mr. Mitchell would not have been present when any
documents were received or reviewed. He simply was not in a position to confirm, based
on his own observations, what was done with the original note. No competent proofs
were offered as to when the note was endorsed, when the note was delivered to Deutsche
Bank, and whether it had been endorsed prior to that time. Indeed, there were no
meaningful proofs offered as to just what had been done with the note prior to the time it
was delivered to plaintiff's counsel around the time the motion for summary judgment
,was argued.
Plaintiff continued to argue that it was entitled to proceed with the foreclosure
based on its ability to produce the note during the litigation, without establishing that it
had possession as of the date of the complaint. Plaintiff also attempted to establish that
the note had in fact been transferred before the complaint was filed in two separate ways.
First, plaintiff offered an additional document intended to establish that Deutsche Bank,
as Custodian, had received and reviewed the notes which were being securitized, and had
confirmed they were in proper form, sometime on or before the closing date. That
document, marked Exhibit "P-24," was in the form of a letter, captioned "Form of Initial
Certification," dated December 21,2004. The letter was addressed to The Bank of New
York, American Home Servicing and GMAC Mortgage Corporation. It referenced a
Custodial Agreement and sections of the Indenture and the Mortgage Loan Purchase
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Agreement. (The Custodial Agreement was not provided at trial.) The letter recited that
the files for each Mortgage Loan on the Mortgage Loan Schedule had been reviewed, that
the documents required were in the Custodian's possession and that the documents
"appear to be regular on their face," except as referenced on an exception report. (There
were several additional documents attached to the letter, including one document
captioned Exception Report Summary. While there was no specific reference to the loan
at issue here in that document, the document itself was difficult to understand. It appears
to list thousands of "exceptions" without relating those exceptions to specific loans.) The
letter was signed by one Andrew Hays, referred to simply as an "Associate" of Deutsche
Bank. It did not indicate whether Mr. Hays himself had reviewed any portion of the
11,000filesthat would have been at issue, or how he would have obtained information as
to reviews conducted by other individuals. The letter was obviously intended to establish
the truth of the matters stated. Plaintiff was unable to establish that it could be admitted
into evidence as a business record. See NJ.R.E. 803(c)(6). Its contents have not been
considered as a part of this analysis.
Second, plaintiff argued that under the circumstances presented it was entitled to a
presumption that it was in possession of the note at the time the complaint was filed,
based on its ability to produce the original note at the time of argument and trial. That
argument was based on the 1935 opinion of the Court of Errors and Appeals in Dolin v.
Darnell 115 NJ.L. 508 (E. & A. 1935), which in turn cited the 1872 opinion of the
Supreme Court of Michigan in Hovev v. Sebring, 24 Mich. 232 (1872). Those cases can
be cited for the proposition that the production of a note at the time of trial raises the
presumption that plaintiff was authorized to prosecute the matter at the time suit was
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filed. This court, however, was not convinced that plaintiff was entitled to the type of
presumption suggested under the facts presented here or that the presumption, if
available, would resolve the issue. The opinions in both Dolin and Hovev acknowledge
that the person attempting to enforce the provisions of a note must generally be in
possession of the note as of the date the action to collect is filed. In Dolin, the payee on
two promissory notes had received payment. The dispute presented was whether the
payment was intended to satisfy the notes, or whether the individual who had made the
payment had simply purchased the notes, intending to pursue the right to collection. It
was stipulated at trial that the plaintiff did not have possession of the notes until long
after the case was filed. The opinion deals with the question of whether the plaintiff could
be considered a "holder" or a "bearer" as of the time the complaint was filed, pursuant to
the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Act in effect at the time. It was determined that
plaintiff could not proceed. The case was dismissed by the trial court and the Court of
Errors and Appeals affirmed. Any presumption that may have arisenfromthe production
of the notes at trial was of no moment to the ultimate result. Hovev addressed the
question of whether the maker of the note at issue should be permitted to challenge the
plaintiffs right to proceed at trial. The plaintiff had testified that he was the "owner" of
the note. The trial court did not permit the defendant to question the plaintiff about that
claim. The Supreme Court of Michigan concluded that the trial court erred and reversed.
Again, any presumption that may have existed was of no moment. Indeed, the holding in
Hovey does suggest that a defendant who challenges a plaintiffs standing may present
that challenge by attacking the plaintiff's proofs.

41

The opinion in Dolin refers to Hovey as "the leading andfrequentlycited case,"
reproducing the following passagefromthat opinion:

It is well settled, as a general rule, that the possession of
such note by the plaintiff producing it on the trial, is prima
facie evidence of his title, or his right to sue upon it, and
that the plaintiff need not be the real or beneficial owner to
entitle him to recover. And liberal as the law is to the
person in whose name the suit may be brought, and in
presuming ownershipfrompossession, we think it has not
gone, and ought not to go, so far as to allow a party to bring
an action before his right of action has accrued: and
whatever may be the state of facts which authorizes the suit
to be brought in the name of any particular person, must, as
a general rule, exist at the time the suit is instituted in his
name. This, it is true would, in ordinary cases, be presumed
from the production of the note by the plaintiff on the trial
but the defendant, we think, may rebut this presumption,
and defeat the action by showing that the state of facts
existing at the time of the institution of the suit hot
authorize the plaintiff to sue. The plaintiff can only recover
upon the cause of action he had at the institution of his suit,
and he is not allowed to sue first and obtain his cause of
action afterwards.
Dolin, 115 N.J.L, at 514-515 (emphasis added).

There are different types of presumptions. Logical presumptions depend for their
validity on the fact that there is an empirically demonstrable probability that, as a matter
of common experience, the presumed fact flows from the underlying fact. Artificial
presumptions, on the other hand, may be based on considerations of public policy. See
Lionshead Woods v. Kaplan Bros., 243 NJ. Super. 678, 682-683 (Law Div, 1990).
Courts are generally reluctant to create presumptions. See Avemco Ins. Co. v. United
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States Fire Ins. Co., 212 N.J. Super. 38,46 (App. Div. 1986). Presumptions may also
become outdated as the law changes. See Troy v. Rutgers, 168 NJ. 354, 365-366 (2001).
Both Dolin and Hovey suggest there are substantial limits to any presumption that
might arise out of a plaintiffs ability to estabUsh his possession of a note sometime after
a complaint has been filed. Each opinion recognizes that the presumption would be
available "in ordinary cases." Each also recognizes the more basic principle involved—
that one seeking to enforce a note should be in possession as of the date the action is
filed. Notably, neither case involved the type of relief requested here, involving a request
for foreclosure. In any event, it would be difficult to conclude that this is an "ordinary"
case, as that term was used in those prior opinions. More generally, it would be difficult
to conclude that the presumption suggested should be available in cases involving the
securitization of mortgage loans with all the complexity attendant on that process. In any
event, this court was not convinced the presumption at issue should be applied to limit
defendant's ability to challenge plaintiff's standing. To the contrary, given the
circumstances presented here, this court was satisfied it was generally appropriate to
require the plaintiff to establish that it did have possession of the note as of the date the
complaint was filed. Given all the circumstances, that does not appear to be an
unreasonable burden to impose on a plaintiff requesting the equitable remedy of
foreclosure, to force the sale of a defendant's property to obtain payment of a debt.
The inapplicability of the presumption sought by plaintiff does not resolve the
factual issue presented at trial—considering all the proofs, was plaintiff able to establish
that it did have possession of the note at the time the complaint was filed? As noted,
plaintiff was not able to offer any direct proofs on that issue. Each party, however,
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argued that the issue should be resolved in its or his favor based on a number of
conflicting inferences suggested by the specific proofs and the general circumstances
presented. Plaintiffs arguments focused on the documents created as a part of the
securitization process. Those documents were admitted into evidence at trial, based on
Mr. Mitchell's testimony. While plaintiff was never able to present the Mortgage Loan
Schedule that should have been attached to the Mortgage Loan Purchase Agreement, it
was able to present a separate schedule maintained by The Bank of New York, which did
refer to defendant's loan. From all the proofs presented, the court was satisfied that
defendant's loan was among the loans which were securitized in 2004. The securitization
documents did provide that the Custodian was to review the files for each mortgage loan,
to confirm that each file contained the documents required, including the original note for
each loan. From those circumstances, plaintiff argued the court could infer that the
review occurred sometime in or around 2004 or 2005, that the file for defendant's loan
was included in that review, and that the Custodian must then have located the original
note in the file, appropriately endorsed. That inference is not illogical. It was considered.
Defendant offered other arguments, suggesting the proofs presented by plaintiff
were suspect, and that other contradictory inferences would be appropriate. Given all the
circumstances presented, it was entirely appropriate to question the reliability of the
materials submitted by plaintiff. The provisions of plaintiff s original complaint referring
to the plaintiff as having become the owner of the note and mortgage "before the
complaint was filed" did not comply with the provision of EL 4:64-l(b)(10) and was
arguably evasive. The MERS assignment was potentially misleading. Plaintiff was never
able to explain, in any meaningful way, why it was unable to locate the Mortgage Loan
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Schedule that should have been attached to the Mortgage Loan Purchase Agreement, or
why it had taken so long to respond the court's prior requests for the production of
documents. Plaintiff was clearly on notice that the court intended to address the question
of whether it had possession of the note as of the date the complaint wasfiledat trial, but
was unable to produce any meaningful proof on the issue. Plaintiff failed to present a
witness from the Custodian, or even an appropriate business record that might have been
maintained by the Custodian to confirm just what had occurred when the mortgage loan
files were to be reviewed. There was also no explanation of just how plaintiffs counsel
had come into possession of the original note. In the absence of such proofs, defendant
argued, the court could infer that the review contemplated by the securitization process
had not occurred, or that plaintiff was simply unable to establish that it had. Those
potential inferences were also logical, and were considered.
This was a factual dispute. Plaintiff was required to establish one basic tact—that
as of the time the complaint was filed, it or its agent did have possession of the note on
which the action was based. This court was satisfied the burden of proof on that issue
rested with plaintiff, and the plaintiff was required to carry that burden by a
preponderance of the evidence. Having considered all of the evidence presented, as well
as the inferences argued, the court was satisfied that the proofs on that issue were in
equipoise. Plaintiff failed to convince the court, even by the preponderance of the
evidence standard, that it did have possession of the note as of the date the complaint was
filed. Accordingly, the complaint has been dismissed without prejudice to plaintiffs right
to institute a new action, provided that any new complaint must be accompanied by a
certification confirming that plaintiff is then in possession of the original note.
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ASSIGNMENTS, THE COURT RULES AND
MOTION PRACTICE
One would assume that in most circumstances a dispute over a plaintiffs right to
proceed with a complaint for foreclosure could be resolved fairly quickly and efficiently.
Obviously, that did not occur here. In the end, that was largely the result of plaintiff s
failure to address the matter directly, both in the original and amended complaint and in
the various submissions related to the prior motion for summary judgment. While the
legal issues may appear complex, the factual issues are fairly focused, even in those cases
involving the securitization of the debt and the handling of negotiable notes. When and
how was the debt transferred to plaintiff? Did the plaintiff have possession of the
underlying note as of the date the complaint wasfiled?Given the amount of time devoted
to the matter, that problem deserves some additional discussion.
The courts have attempted to require some degree of transparency in foreclosure
litigation. That is appropriate for several reasons. Obviously, a litigant facing
foreclosure has the right to understand the basis upon which a plaintiff is proceeding.
When the issue is not clearly addressed, trial courts may be required to devote some
substantial time and effort in resolving these types of disputes. In addition, court staff,
particularly in the Office of Foreclosure, are required to confirm the circumstances
presented in processing requests for the entry of judgment. See R. 1:34-6.
R. 4:64 deals with the type of disclosure required of plaintiffs in a number of
ways, dealing both with the contents of the foreclosure complaint and the materials which
must be submitted with an application for judgment. In each case, the applicable section
of the Rule deals with the need to disclose "assignments," a term which can be
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problematic. R. 4:64-2(a) deals with applications for judgment, requiring that those
applications include "the original mortgage, evidence of indebtedness, assignments, claim
of hen, and any other original documents upon which a claim is based." (emphasis
supplied) EL 4:64-1(b) deals with the contents of the complaint, requiring the recitation
of a great deal of information. R 4:64-l(b)(10) is the subsection of the Rule apparently
intended to deal with prior transfers from the original mortgagee. Again, the Rule deals
with the matter by reference to potential assignments. That subsection of the Rule reads
as follows:
The complaint shall state .. .(10) if the plaintiff is not the
original mortgagee or the original nominee mortgagee the
names of the original mortgagee and a recital of all
assignments in the chain of title, (emphasis supplied)
R4:64-l(b)(10).
The term "assignment" can have several meanings. The term can be used to refer
to the actual transfer of an interestfromone individual or entity to another.
Alternatively, the term can be used to refer to the document which is issued to reflect that
transfer. See Black's Law Dictionary 136 (9th ed. 20091 The use of that term in these
types of circumstances can be confusing.
The enforcement of R 4:64-l(b)(10) has been problematic both for the trial courts
and the Office of Foreclosure. That general problem is evident here, in a variety of ways.
The original complaint in this matter was filed in February 2009. The plaintiff identified
in the complaint was not the original mortgagee. There was no meaningful attempt to
comply with the provisions of JL 4:64-l(b)(10) by "reciting all assignments in the chain
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of title." The complaint simply recited that plaintiff had become the owner of the note
and mortgage "before the within complaint was drafted."
The MERS assignment was not executed and recorded until after the initial
complaint was filed. Presumably that was done to create a public record of the transfer,
in anticipation of the foreclosure being instituted in the name of plaintiff. By its own
terms, the document recites that MERS "does hereby .... assign, transfer, convey, set
over and deliver" the mortgage and "the money due or to become due" to plaintiff. That
language suggests that the actual transfer was effected through the execution of the
document itself Similarly, the amended complaint, filed in May 2009, was apparently
intended to suggest that the transfer of the debt was effected through the execution of the
MERS assignment. The execution of the MERS assignment and the reference to that
assignment in the amended complaint was, at best, confusing. (As an aside, the execution
and recording of a written assignment are not essential to a transferee's right to proceed.
Agreements to transfer interests in real estate can be enforced, even if they are not in
writing. See N.J.S.A. 25:1-13 (permitting the enforcement of an oral agreement to
transfer an interest in real estate, provided the proofs establish such an agreement by clear
and convincing evidence). Assignments without writings will be effective in equity. See 1
Nelson & Whitman, Real Estate Finance Law 5.28 n.3 (3d. ed. 1993). While a written
assignment may be recorded, it is presumably enforceable between the parties to the
assignment, irrespective of its recording.)
To the extent the recording of the MERS assignment was somehow intended to
deal with the requirements of Rule 4:64-1 (b)(10), one can ask whether the Rule, as
currently phrased, is effective. Was the Rule intended simply to require that a plaintiff
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recite the history of recorded assignments, as suggested by the Rule's reference to "the
chain of title?" Should the Rule be interpreted more broadly to require the disclosure of
all transfers of interests in the mortgage and the underlying debt? Should the Rule be
amended to address those issues? Should the Rules require more specific disclosure when
a mortgage loan has been securitized, or when the matter involves the handling of a
negotiable note, where possession is essential to one's ability to proceed? See also R
4:64-l(b)(l 1), requiring that the complaint recite "the names of all parties in interest
whose interest is subordinate or affected by the mortgage foreclosure action."
Separate issues are presented when the matter involves the enforcement of a
negotiable instrument. Should the rules require that the complaint specifically recite that
plaintiff is in possession of the note, as of the date the complaint is filed? Should plaintiff
be required to disclose the physical location of the note, as of the date the complaint is
filed?
Perhaps the Rules of Court should be modified to provide for more specific
disclosure. Any revision to the Rules would have to be addressed in another forum. This
court, however, does have the ability to determine just how the issues noted will be
addressed in the contested matters assigned to it, which are all actively managed. In that
context, this court anticipates it will require the types of disclosures contemplated above
in all proceedings in which there is a challenge to plaintiffs standing. There is no
apparent reason why a plaintiff should not be expected to provide competent proofs as to
the location of the note promptly, as soon as the issue is joined.
Our Rules recognize the need to identify those issues which are truly in dispute in
a variety of ways. See R. 4:46-2 (dealing with the standard to be applied in dealing with
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motions for summary judgment), Rule l:l-2(a) (permitting the relaxation of the rules to
avoid an injustice), NJ.R.E. 101(a)(4) (permitting undisputed facts to be proved by any
relevant evidence) and RPC 3.1 (prohibiting a lawyerfrompursuingfrivolousclaims).
As a routine matter, plaintiffs attorneys should be prepared to confirm whether the
underlying obligation is evidenced by a negotiable note. If that is the case, plaintiffs will
be expected to confirm that the note was in the possession of the plaintiff at the time the
original complaint wasfiled,and just where the note is being held.
In those cases where the loan was securitized, additional disclosure should be
provided as a matter of course. Plaintiff should be prepared to provide the underlying
documentation reflecting the securitization process, with a meaningful analysis of just
how the debt was transferred to the plaintiff. Copies of any loan purchase agreements,
pooling arid servicing agreements or any other agreements which provide for the transfer
of the debt are to be provided, with copies of the applicable schedules identifying the
particular loan at issue. Depending on the circumstances, it may be possible to redact
portions of the documents or schedules being provided, particularly when the underlying
documents were previously provided in discovery. The information and documentation
noted should be provided with a competent certification executed by an officer or
employee of the plaintiff. Certifications from plaintiffs' counsel will generally not be
adequate. (It is possible that in a given case, the original note may have been delivered to
plaintiffs counsel, either before or during the litigation. Where that has occurred, a
certification from someone associated with the lawfirmmay be appropriate. Counsel
should be sensitive, however, to problems presented where lawyers become potential
witnesses. See RPC 3.7.) All of that information and documentation should be made
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available to defendants as soon as the standing issue is joined, to permit legitimate
disputes regarding standing to be addressed promptly and efficiently. Obviously, any
motion for summary judgment dealing with the issue of standing, should also be
accompanied by proofs focusing on the issues discussed in this opinion. With
appropriate proofs focused on possession of the note as of the date of complaint it should
not be difficult for a plaintiff to establish itsrightto proceed. Conversely, it may be
entirely appropriate to bar a plaintiff who has not been able to present those proofs from
proceeding, without the need for extended proceedings.
PREDATORY LENDING, THE SERVICER
AS PLAINTIFF
There are a number of issues that are not addressed in this opinion which deserve
some brief comment.
First, this case does not involve substantive defenses or affirmative claims, aside
from the issue of standing. The defendants in this case have been involved in other
litigation in this court. They are sophisticated investors who elected to speculate in the
development of real estate. There is no indication they did not understand the terms on
which the funds in question where borrowed, or the fact that the real estate was pledged
as security and was ultimately subject to foreclosure. Asidefromthe dispute as to
standing, defendant Krywopusk has no defense to the foreclosure itself.
If the matter did involve other claims or defenses, a variety of additional disputes
might be presented requiring additional inquiries into the manner by which the
underlying debt was transferred to plaintiff. By way of example, a plaintiff will typically
defend a predatory lending claim by asserting it is a holder in due course, entitled to

51

specific protections under the Uniform Commercial Code. An assignee who is a holder in
due course would hold the debt free of most, but not all, defenses which might be
asserted against the original lender. One's status as a holder in due course, however, is
dependent on a number of circumstances. The note must be negotiable and must have
been negotiated. Negotiation, in turn, would require a transfer of possession and the
endorsement of the note. To be a holder in due course, the assignee must have taken the
instrument (1) for value, (2) in good faith, and (3) without notice of any defense or of the
debt being overdue. A dispute over whether an assignee is a holder in due course, taking
the debtfreeof potential defenses, may require a much more detailed inquiry into the
date of the transfer and negotiation and the circumstances surrounding the transfer. See
29 New Jersey Practice, Law of Mortgage 11.5 at 774-790 (Myron C. Weinstein) (2d ed.
2001), N.J.S.A. 12A:3-104, N.J.S.A. 12A:3-20l(b), NJ.S.A. 12A:3-203(c), N.J.S.A.
12A:3-302(a), and New Jersey Mortgage & Investment Corp. v. Calvetti 68 N.J. Super.
18 (App. Div. 1961). It is entirely conceivable that the plaintiff in this matter would not
have the status of a holder in due course and would therefore be subject to any number of
specific defenses that might have been asserted against the original lender. This is not a
case, however, which involves the types of defenses which would require an inquiry as to
plaintiffs status as a holder in due course.
In addition, this opinion does not address the issues arisingfromwhen an original
negotiable note is lost. In those circumstances, additional inquiries would be required.
See N. ISA. 12A3-301 and NJ.S.A. 12A:3~309.
Finally, this opinion also does not address the question of whether an action to
foreclose can be brought in the name of a servicer. Foreclosure complaints are
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sometimes filed in the name of the servicer, rather than in the name of the entity for
which the loan is being serviced. That can occur whether or not the underlying loan has
been securitized. If the mortgage being foreclosed is based on a negotiable note, a
number of additional inquiries may be necessary. Has the note been delivered to the
servicer, making it a holder or a non holder in possession with the right to enforce? If not,
could the matter proceed in the name of the servicer, as the agent of the holder or
nonholder in possession? Those issues are not presented here.

CONCLUSION
Defendant's attack on plaintiff's ability to proceed with the foreclosure based on
the alleged "separation" of the note an mortgage was rejected. Plaintiff, however, failed
to establish that it was entitled to enforce the note as of the time the complaint was filed.
In this case, there are no compelling reasons to permit plaintiff to proceed in this action.
Accordingly, the complaint has been dismissed. That dismissal is without prejudice to
plaintiff's right to institute a new action to foreclose at any time, provided that any new
complaint must be accompanied by an appropriate certification, executed by one with
personal knowledge of the circumstances, confirming that plaintiff is in possession of the
original note as of the date any new action isfiled.That certification must indicate the
physical location of the note and the name of the individual or entity in possession.
An appropriate order has been entered
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oreclosure of mortgage.
;iVIL ACTIONS commenced in the Land Court Department on September 16 and October 30, 2008.
lotions for entry of default judgment and to vacate judgment were heard by Keith C. Long, J.
"he Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for direct appellate review.
!. Bruce Allensworth (Phoebe S. Winder & Robert W. Sparkes, III, with him) for U.S..Bank National Association
.another.
aul R. Collier, III (Max W. Weinstein with him) for Antonio Ibanez.
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svin Costello, Gary Klein, Shennan Kavanagh & Stuart Rossman for National Consumer Law Center &
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ard P. Graham & Robert J. Moriarty, Jr., for Real Estate Bar Association for Massachusetts, Inc.

Brie McDonnell, pro se.
esent: Marshall, C.J., Ireland, Spina, Cordy, Botsford, & Gants, Jj.
[FN4]

UMTS, J.
ter foreclosing on two properties and purchasing the properties back at the foreclosure sales, U.S.
ink National Association (U.S.Bank), as trustee for the Structured Asset Securities Corporation
^rtgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2006-Z; and Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (Wells Fargo), as
jstee for ABFC 2005-OPT 1 Trust, ABFC Asset Backed Certificates, Series 2005-OPT 1 (plaintiffs)
3d separate complaints in the Land Court asking a judge to declare that they held clear title to the
Dperties in fee simple. We agree with the judge that the plaintiffs, who were not the original
>rtgagees, failed to make the required showing that they were the holders of the mortgages at the
ne of foreclosure. As a result, they did not demonstrate that the foreclosure sales were valid to
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convey title to the subject properties, and their requests for a declaration of clear title were
properly denied. [FN5]
Procedural history. On July 5, 2007, U.S. Bank, as trustee, foreclosed on the mortgage of Antonio
Ibanez, and purchased the Ibanez property at the foreclosure sale. On the same day, Wells Fargo,
as trustee, foreclosed on the mortgage of Mark and Tammy LaRace, and purchased the LaRace
property at that foreclosure sale.
In September and October of 2008, U.S. Bank and Wells Fargo brought separate actions in the Land
Court under G.L c. 240, § 6, which authorizes actions "to quiet or establish the title to land situated
in the commonwealth or to remove a cloud from the title thereto." The two complaints sought
identical relief: (1) a judgment that the right, title, and interest of the mortgagor (Ibanez or the
LaRaces) in the property was extinguished by the foreclosure; (2) a declaration that there was no
cloud on title arising from publication of the notice of sale in the Boston Globe; and (3) a declaration
that title was vested in the plaintiff trustee in fee simple. U.S. Bank and Wells Fargo each asserted
in its complaint that it had become the holder of the respective mortgage through an assignment
made after the foreclosure sale.
In both cases, the mortgagors--Ibanez and the LaRaces--did not initially answer the complaints, and
the plaintiffs moved for entry of default judgment. In their motions for entry of default judgment, the
plaintiffs addressed two issues: (1) whether the Boston Globe, in which the required notices of the
foreclosure sales were published, is a newspaper of "general circulation" in Springfield, the town
where the foreclosed properties lay. See G.L. c. 244, § 14 (requiring publication every week for three
weeks in newspaper published in town where foreclosed property lies, or of general circulation in that
town); and (2) whether the plaintiffs were legally entitled to foreclose on the properties where the
assignments of the mortgages to the plaintiffs were neither executed nor recorded in the registry of
deeds until after the foreclosure sales. [FN6] The two cases were heard together by the Land Court,
along with a third case that raised the same issues.
On March 26, 2009, judgment was entered against the plaintiffs. The judge ruled that the
foreclosure sales were invalid because, in violation of G.L. c. 244, § 14, the notices of the
foreclosure sales named U.S. Bank (in the Ibanez foreclosure) and Wells Fargo (in the LaRace
foreclosure) as the mortgage holders where they had not yet been assigned the mortgages. [FN7]
The judge found, based on each plaintiffs assertions in its complaint, that the plaintiffs acquired the
mortgages by assignment only after the foreclosure sales and thus had no interest in the mortgages
being foreclosed at the time of the publication of the notices of sale or at the time of the
foreclosure sales.
[FN8]

The plaintiffs then moved to vacate the judgments. At a hearing on the motions on April 17, 2009,
the plaintiffs conceded that each complaint alleged a postnotice, postforeclosure sale assignment of
the mortgage at issue, but they now represented to the judge that documents might exist that
could show a prenotice, preforeclosure sale assignment of the mortgages. The judge granted the
plaintiffs leave to produce such documents, provided they were produced in the form they existed in
at the time the foreclosure sale was noticed and conducted. In response, the plaintiffs submitted
hundreds of pages of documents to the judge, which they claimed established that the mortgages
had been assigned to them before the foreclosures. Many of these documents related to the
:reation of the securitized mortgage pools in which the Ibanez and LaRace mortgages were
Durportedly included. [FN9]
The judge denied the plaintiffs1 motions to vacate judgment on October 14, 2009, concluding that
:he newly submitted documents did not alter the conclusion that the plaintiffs were not the holders
)f the respective mortgages at the time of foreclosure. We granted the parties1 applications for
lirect appellate review.
-actual background. We discuss each mortgage separately, describing when appropriate what- th&
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plaintiffs allege to have happened and what the documents in the record demonstrate. [FN10]
The Ibanez mortgage. On December 1, 2005, Antonio Ibanez took out a $103,500 loan for the
purchase of property at 20 Crosby Street in Springfield, secured by a mortgage to the lender, Rose
Mortgage, Inc. (Rose Mortgage). The mortgage was recorded the following day. Several days later,
Rose Mortgage executed an assignment of this mortgage in blank, that is, an assignment that did
not specify the name of the assignee. [ F N l l ] The blank space in the assignment was at some point
stamped with the name of Option One Mortgage Corporation (Option One) as the assignee, and that
assignment was recorded on June 7, 2006. Before the recording, on January 23, 2006, Option One
executed an assignment of the Ibanez mortgage in blank.
According to U.S. Bank, Option One assigned the Ibanez mortgage to Lehman Brothers Bank, FSB,
which assigned it to Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc., which then assigned it to the Structured Asset
Securities Corporation, [FN12] which then assigned the mortgage, pooled with approximately 1,220
Dther mortgage loans, to U.S. Bank, as trustee for the Structured Asset Securities Corporation
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2006-Z. With this last assignment, the Ibanez and other
oans were pooled into a trust and converted into mortgage-backed securities that can be bought
and sold by investors--a process known as securitization.
:

or ease of reference, the chain of entities through which the Ibanez mortgage allegedly passed
>efore the foreclosure sale is:
Rose Mortgage, Inc. (originator)
«ArrowDn»
Option One Mortgage Corporation (record holder)
«ArrowDn»
Lehman Brothers Bank, FSB
«ArrowDn»
Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. (seller)
«ArrowDn»
Structured Asset Securities Corporation (depositor)
«ArrowDn»
U.S. Bank National Association, as trustee for the Structured Asset Securities
Corporation Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2006-Z
ccording to U.S. Bank, the assignment of the Ibanez mortgage to U.S. Bank occurred pursuant to a
scember 1, 2006, trust agreement, which is not in the record. What is in the record is the private
acement memorandum (PPM)f dated December 26, 2006, a 273-page, unsigned offer of mortgageacked securities to potential investors. The PPM describes the mortgage pools and the entities
volved, and summarizes the provisions of the trust agreement, including the representation that
ortgages "will be" assigned into the trust. According to the PPM, ,f [e]ach transfer of a Mortgage
>an from the Seller [Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc.] to the Depositor [Structured Asset Securities
)rporation] and from the Depositor to the Trustee [U.S. Bank] will be intended to be a sale of that
Drtgage Loan and will be reflected as such in the Sale and Assignment Agreement and the Trust
jreement, respectively." The PPM also specifies that "[e]ach Mortgage Loan will be identified in a
hedule appearing as an exhibit to the Trust Agreement." However, U.S. Bank did not provide the
dge with any mortgage schedule identifying the Ibanez loan as among the mortgages that were
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assigned in the trust agreement.
On April 17, 2007, U.S. Bank filed a complaint to foreclose on the Ibanez mortgage in the Land Court
under the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act (Servicemembers Act), which restricts foreclosures against
active duty members of the uniformed sen/ices. See 50 U.S.C. Appendix §§ 501, 511, 533 (2006 &
Supp. II 2008). [FN13] In the complaint, U.S. Bank represented that it was the "owner (or assignee)
and holder" of the mortgage given by Ibanez for the property. A judgment issued on behalf of U.S.
Bank on June 26, 2007, declaring that the mortgagor was not entitled to protection from foreclosure
under the Servicemembers Act. In June, 2007, U.S. Bank also caused to be published in the Boston
Globe the notice of the foreclosure sale required by G.L. c. 244, § 14. The notice identified U.S. Bank
as the "present holder" of the mortgage.
At the foreclosure sale on July 5, 2007, the Ibanez property was purchased by U.S. EJank, as trustee
for the securitization trust, for $94,350, a value significantly less than the outstanding debt and the
estimated market value of the property. The foreclosure deed (from U.S. Bank, trustee, as the
purported holder of the mortgage, to U.S. Bank, trustee, as the purchaser) and the statutory
foreclosure affidavit were recorded on May 23, 2008. On September 2, 2008, more than one year
after the sale, and more than five months after recording of the sale, American Home Mortgage
Servicing, Inc., "as successor-in-interest" to Option One, which was until then the record holder of
the Ibanez mortgage, executed a written assignment of that mortgage to U.S. Bank, as trustee for
the securitization trust. [FN14] This assignment was recorded on September 11, 2008.
The LaRace mortgage. On May 19, 2005, Mark and Tammy LaRace gave a mortgage for the property
at 6 Brookburn Street in Springfield to Option One as security for a $103,200 loan; the mortgage was
recorded that same day. On May 26, 2005, Option One executed an assignment of this mortgage in
blank.
According to Wells Fargo, Option One later assigned the LaRace mortgage to Bank of America in a
July 28, 2005, flow sale and servicing agreement. Bank of America then assigned it to Asset Backed
Funding Corporation (ABFC) in an October 1, 2005, mortgage loan purchase agreement. Finally, ABFC
pooled the mortgage with others and assigned it to Wells Fargo, as trustee for the ABFC 2005-OPT 1
Trust, ABFC Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2005-OPT 1, pursuant to a pooling and servicing
agreement (PSA).
For ease of reference, the chain of entities through which the LaRace mortgage allegedly passed
before the foreclosure sale is:
Option One Mortgage Corporation (originator and record holder)
Bank of America
Asset Backed Funding Corporation (depositor)
Wells Fargo, as trustee for the ABFC 2005-OPT 1, ABFC Asset-Backed
Certificates, Series 2005-OPT 1
Veils Fargo did not provide the judge with a copy of the flow sale and servicing agreement, so there
> no document in the record reflecting an assignment of the LaRace mortgage by Option One to
ank of America. The plaintiff did produce an unexecuted copy of the mortgage loan purchase
greement, which was an exhibit to the PSA. The mortgage loan purchase agreement provides that
ank of America, as seller, "does hereby agree to and does hereby sell, assign, set over, and
therwise convey to the Purchaser [ABFC], without recourse, on the Closing Date ... all of its right,
tie and interest in and to each Mortgage Loan." The agreement makes reference to a schedule
>ting the assigned mortgage loans, but this schedule is not in the record, so there was no
Dcument before the judge showing that the LaRace mortgage was among the mortgage loans
ssigned to the ABFC.
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Wells Fargo did provide the judge with a copy of the PSA, which is an agreement between the ABFC
(as depositor), Option One (as servicer), and Wells Fargo (as trustee), but this copy was
downloaded from the Securities and Exchange Commission website and was not signed. The PSA
provides that the depositor "does hereby transfer, assign, set over and otherwise convey to the
Trustee, on behalf of the Trust ... all the right, title and interest of the Depositor... in and to ...
each Mortgage Loan identified on the Mortgage Loan Schedules," and "does hereby deliver" to the
trustee the original mortgage note, an original mortgage assignment "in form and substance
acceptable for recording," and other documents pertaining to each mortgage.
The copy of the PSA provided to the judge did not contain the loan schedules referenced in the
agreement. Instead, Wells Fargo submitted a schedule that it represented identified the loans
assigned in the PSA, which did not include property addresses, names of mortgagors, or any number
that corresponds to the loan number or servicing number on the LaRace mortgage. Wells Fargo
contends that a loan with the LaRace property's zip code and city is the LaRace mortgage loan
because the payment history and loan amount matches the LaRace loan.
On April 27, 2007, Wells Fargo filed a complaint under the Servicemembers Act in the Land Court to
foreclose on the LaRace mortgage. The complaint represented Wells Fargo as the "owner (or
assignee) and holder" of the mortgage given by the LaRaces for the property. A judgment issued on
behalf of Wells Fargo on July 3, 2007, indicating that the LaRaces were not beneficiaries of the
Servicemembers Act and that foreclosure could proceed in accordance with the terms of the power
of sale. In June, 2007, Wells Fargo caused to be published in the Boston Globe the statutory notice
of sale, identifying itself as the "present holder" of the mortgage.
At the foreclosure sale on July 5, 2007, Wells Fargo, as trustee, purchased the LaRace property for
$120,397.03, a value significantly below its estimated market value. Wells Fargo did not execute a
statutory foreclosure affidavit or foreclosure deed until May 7, 2008. That same day, Option One,
which was still the record holder of the LaRace mortgage, executed an assignment of the mortgage
to Wells Fargo as trustee; the assignment was recorded on May 12, 2008. Although executed ten
months after the foreclosure sale, the assignment declared an effective date of April 18, 2007, a
date that preceded the publication of the notice of sale and the foreclosure sale.
Discussion. The plaintiffs brought actions under G.L. c. 240, § 6, seeking declarations that the
defendant mortgagors1 titles had been extinguished and that the plaintiffs were the fee simple
Dwners of the foreclosed properties. As such, the plaintiffs bore the burden of establishing their
entitlement to the relief sought. Sheriff's Meadow Found,, Inc. v. Bay-Courte Edgartown, Inc., 401
viass, 267, 269 (1987). To meet this burden, they were required "not merely to demonstrate better
:itle ... than the defendants possess, but ... to prove sufficient title to succeed in [the] action." Id.
See NationsBanc Mtge. Corp. v. Eisenhauer, 49 Mass.App.Ct. 727, 730 (2000). There is no question
:hat the relief the plaintiffs sought required them to establish the validity of the foreclosure sales on
which their claim to clear title rested.
Massachusetts does not require a mortgage holder to obtain judicial authorization to foreclose on a
Tiortgaged property. See G.L. c. 183, § 2 1 ; G.L. c. 244, § 14. With the exception of the limited
udicial procedure aimed at certifying that the mortgagor is not a beneficiary of the Servicemembers
\ct, a mortgage holder can foreclose on a property, as the plaintiffs did here, by exercise of the
statutory power of sale, if such a power is granted by the mortgage itself. See Beaton v. Land
Zourt, 367 Mass. 385, 390-391, 393, appeal dismissed, 423 U.S. 806 (1975).
Vhere a mortgage grants a mortgage holder the power of sale, as did both the Ibanez and LaRace
nortgages, it includes by reference the power of sale set out in G.L. c. 183, § 2 1 , and further
egulated by G.L. c. 244, §§ 11-17C. Under G.L c. 183, § 2 1 , after a mortgagor defaults in the
>erformance of the underlying note, the mortgage holder may sell the property at a public auction
md convey the property to the purchaser in fee simple, "and such sale shall forever bar the
nortgagor and all persons claiming under him from all right and interest in the mortgaged premises,
whether at law or in equity." Even where there is a dispute as to whether the mortgagor was in
lefault or whether the party claiming to be the mortgage holder is the true mortgage holder, the
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foreclosure goes forward unless the mortgagor files an action and obtains a court order enjoining the
foreclosure. [FN15] See Beaton v. Land Court, supra at 393.
Recognizing the substantial power that the statutory scheme affords to a mortgage holder to
foreclose without immediate judicial oversight, we adhere to the familiar rule that "one who sells
under a power [of sale] must follow strictly its terms. If he fails to do so there is no valid execution
of the power, and the sale is wholly void." Moore v. Dick, 187 Mass. 207, 211 (1905). See Roche v.
Farnsworth, 106 Mass. 509, 513 (1871) (power of sale contained in mortgage "must be executed in
strict compliance with its terms"). See also McGreevey v. Charlestown Five Cents Sav. Bank, 294
Mass. 480, 484 (1936). [FN16]
One of the terms of the power of sale that must be strictly adhered to is the restriction on who is
entitled to foreclose. The "statutory power of sale" can be exercised by "the mortgagee or his
executors, administrators, successors or assigns." G.L c. 183, § 21. Under G.L c. 244, § 14, "[t]he
mortgagee or person having his estate in the land mortgaged, or a person authorized by the power
of sale, or the attorney duly authorized by a writing under seal, or the legal guardian or conservator
of such mortgagee or person acting in the name of such mortgagee or person" is empowered to
exercise the statutory power of sale. Any effort to foreclose by a party lacking "jurisdiction and
authority" to carry out a foreclosure under these statutes is void. Chace v. Morse, 189 Mass. 559,
561 (1905), citing Moore v. Dick, supra. See Davenport v. HSBC Bank USA, 275 Mich.App. 344, 347348 (2007) (attempt to foreclose by party that had not yet been assigned mortgage results in
"structural defect that goes to the very heart of defendants ability to foreclose by advertisement,"
and renders foreclosure sale void).
A related statutory requirement that must be strictly adhered to in a foreclosure by power of sale is
the notice requirement articulated in G.L. c. 244, § 14. That statute provides that "no sale under
such power shall be effectual to foreclose a mortgage, unless, previous to such sale," advance
notice of the foreclosure sale has been provided to the mortgagee, to other interested parties, and
by publication in a newspaper published in the town where the mortgaged land lies or of general
circulation in that town. Id. T h e manner in which the notice of the proposed sale shall be given is
one of the important terms of the power, and a strict compliance with it is essential to the valid
exercise of the power." Moore v. Dick, supra at 212. See Chace v. Morse, supra ("where a certain
notice is prescribed, a sale without any notice, or upon a notice lacking the essential requirements
of the written power, would be void as a proceeding for foreclosure"). See also McGreevey v.
Charlestown Five Cents Sav. Bank, supra. Because only a present holder of the mortgage is
authorized to foreclose on the mortgaged property, and because the mortgagor is entitled t o know
who is foreclosing and selling the property, the failure to identify the holder of the mortgage in the
notice of sale may render the notice defective and the foreclosure sale void. [FN17] See Roche v.
Farnsworth, supra (mortgage sale void where notice of sale identified original mortgagee but not
mortgage holder at time of notice and sale). See also Bottomly v. Kabachnick, 13 Mass.App.Ct. 480,
483-484 (1982) (foreclosure void where holder of mortgage not identified in notice of sale).
For the plaintiffs to obtain the judicial declaration of clear title that they seek, they had t o prove
:heir authority to foreclose under the power of sale and show their compliance with the requirements
:>n which this authority rests. Here, the plaintiffs were not the original mortgagees to whom the
)ower of sale was granted; rather, they claimed the authority to foreclose as the eventual
assignees of the original mortgagees. Under the plain language of G.L c. 183, § 2 1 , and G.L c. 244,
i 14, the plaintiffs had the authority to exercise the power of sale contained in the Ibanez and
.aRace mortgages only if they were the assignees of the mortgages at the time of the notice of sale
md the subsequent foreclosure sale. See In re Schwartz, 366 B.R. 265, 269 (Bankr.D.Mass.2007)
"Acquiring the mortgage after the entry and foreclosure sale does not satisfy the Massachusetts
tatute"). [FN18] See also Jeff-Ray Corp. v. Jacobson, 566 So.2d 885, 886 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1990)
per curiam) (foreclosure action could not be based on assignment of mortgage dated four months
fter commencement of foreclosure proceeding).
he plaintiffs claim that the securitization documents they submitted establish valid assignments
nat made them the holders of the Ibanez and LaRace mortgages before the notice of sale and t-hp
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foreclosure sale. We turn, then, to the documentation submitted by the plaintiffs to determine
whether it met the requirements of a valid assignment.
Like a sale of land itself, the assignment of a mortgage is a conveyance of an interest in land that
requires a writing signed by the grantor. See G.L c. 183, § 3; Saint Patrick's Religious, Ecluc. &
Charitable Ass'n v. Hale, 227 Mass. 175, 177 (1917). In a "title theory state" like Massachusetts, a
mortgage is a transfer of legal title in a property to secure a debt. See Faneuil Investors Group, Ltd.
Partnership v. Selectmen of Dennis, 458 Mass. 1, 6 (2010). Therefore, when a person borrows
money to purchase a home and gives the lender a mortgage, the homeowner-mortgagor retains only
equitable title in the home; the legal title is held by the mortgagee. See Vee Jay Realty Trust Co. v.
DiCroce, 360 Mass. 751, 753 (1972), quoting Dolliver v. St. Joseph Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 128 Mass.
315, 316 (1880) (although "as to all the world except the mortgagee, a mortgagor is the owner of
the mortgaged lands," mortgagee has legal title to property); Maglione v. BancBoston Mtge. Corp.,
29 Mass.App.Ct. 88, 90 (1990). Where, as here, mortgage loans are pooled together in a trust and
:onverted into mortgage-backed securities, the underlying promissory notes serve as financial
nstruments generating a potential income stream for investors, but the mortgages securing these
lotes are still legal title to someone's home or farm and must be treated as such.
:

ocusing first on the Ibanez mortgage, U.S. Bank argues that it was assigned the mortgage under
he trust agreement described in the PPM, but it did not submit a copy of this trust agreement to
he judge. The PPM, however, described the trust agreement as an agreement to be executed in the
uture, so it only furnished evidence of an intent to assign mortgages to U.S. Bank, not proof of their
ictual assignment. Even if there were an executed trust agreement with language of present
issignment, U.S. Bank did not produce the schedule of loans and mortgages that was an exhibit to
hat agreement, so it failed to show that the Ibanez mortgage was among the mortgages to be
ssigned by that agreement. Finally, even if there were an executed trust agreement with the
squired schedule, U.S. Bank failed to furnish any evidence that the entity assigning the mortgage-tructured Asset Securities Corppration--ever held the mortgage to be assigned. The last
ssignment of the mortgage on record was from Rose Mortgage to Option One; nothing was
ubmitted to the judge indicating that Option One ever assigned the mortgage to anyone before the
)reclosure sale. [FN19] Thus, based on the documents submitted to the judge, Option One, not
.S. Bank, was the mortgage holder at the time of the foreclosure, and U.S. Bank did not have the
uthority to foreclose the mortgage.
urning to the LaRace mortgage, Wells Fargo claims that, before it issued the foreclosure notice, it
as assigned the LaRace mortgage under the PSA. The PSA, in contrast with U.S. Bank's PPM, uses
\e language of a present assignment ("does hereby ... assign" and "does hereby deliver") rather
lan an intent to assign in the future. But the mortgage loan schedule Wells Fargo submitted failed
) identify with adequate specificity the LaRace mortgage as one of the mortgages assigned in the
5A. Moreover, Wells Fargo provided the judge with no document that reflected that the ABFC
lepositor) held the LaRace mortgage that it was purportedly assigning in the PSA. As with the
anez loan, the record holder of the LaRace loan was Option One, and nothing was submitted to the
dge which demonstrated that the LaRace loan was ever assigned by Option One to another entity
sfore the publication of the notice and the sale.
here a plaintiff files a complaint asking for a declaration of clear title after a mortgage foreclosure,
judge is entitled to ask for proof that the foreclosing entity was the mortgage holder at the time of
e notice of sale and foreclosure, or was one of the parties authorized to foreclose under G.L c.
3, § 2 1 , and G.L. c. 244, § 14. A plaintiff that cannot make this modest showing cannot justly
Dclaim that it was unfairly denied a declaration of clear title. See In re Schwartz, supra at 266
When HomEq [Servicing Corporation] was required to prove its authority to conduct the sale, and
spite having been given ample opportunity to do so, what it produced instead was a jumble of
cuments and conclusory statements, some of which are not supported by the documents and
leed even contradicted by them"). See also Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC v. Nelson, 382 IILApp.3d
84, 1188 (2008) (reversing grant of summary judgment in favor of financial entity in foreclosure
kion, where there was "no evidence that [the entity] ever obtained any legal interest in the
Dject property").
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We do not suggest that an assignment must be in recordable form at the time of the notice of sale
or the subsequent foreclosure sale, although recording is likely the better practice. Where a pool of
mortgages is assigned to a securitized trust, the executed agreement that assigns the pool of
mortgages, with a schedule of the pooled mortgage loans that clearly and specifically identifies the
mortgage at issue as among those assigned, may suffice to establish the trustee as the mortgage
holder. However, there must be proof that the assignment was made by a party that itself held the
mortgage. See In re Samuels, 415 B.R. 8, 20 (Bankr„D.Mass.2009). A foreclosing entity may provide
a complete chain of assignments linking it to the record holder of the mortgage, or a single
assignment from the record holder of the mortgage. See In re Parrish, 326 B.R. 708, 720
(Bankr.N.D.Ohio 2005) ("If the claimant acquired the note and mortgage from the original lender or
from another party who acquired it from the original lender, the claimant can meet its burden
through evidence that traces the loan from the original lender to the claimant"). The key in either
case is that the foreclosing entity must hold the mortgage at the time of the notice and sale in order
accurately to identify itself as the present holder in the notice and in order to have the authority to
foreclose under the power of sale (or the foreclosing entity must be one of the parties authorized to
foreclose under G.L c. 183, § 2 1 , and G.L c. 244, § 14).
The judge did not err in concluding that the securitization documents submitted by the plaintiffs
failed to demonstrate that they were the holders of the Ibanez and LaRace mortgages, respectively,
at the time of the publication of the notices and the sales. The judge, therefore, did not err in
rendering judgments against the plaintiffs and in denying the plaintiffs1 motions to vacate the
judgments. [FN20]
We now turn briefly to three other arguments raised by the plaintiffs on appeal. First, the plaintiffs
initially contended that the assignments in blank executed by Option One, identifying the assignor
but not the assignee, not only "evidence[ ] and confirm[ ] the assignments that occurred by virtue
of the securitization agreements," but "are effective assignments in their own right." But in their
reply briefs they conceded that the assignments in blank did not constitute a lawful assignment of
the mortgages. Their concession is appropriate. We have long held that a conveyance of real
property, such as a mortgage, that does not name the assignee conveys nothing and is void; we do
not regard an assignment of land in blank as giving legal title in land to the bearer of the assignment.
See Flavin v. Morrissey, 327 Mass. 217, 219 (1951); Macurda v. Fuller, 225 Mass. 341, 344 (1916).
See also G.L. c. 183, § 3.
Second, the plaintiffs contend that, because they held the mortgage note, they had a sufficient
financial interest in the mortgage to allow them to foreclose. In Massachusetts, where a note has
been assigned but there is no written assignment of the mortgage underlying the note, the
assignment of the note does not carry with it the assignment of the mortgage. Barnes v. Boardman,
149 Mass. 106, 114 (1889). Rather, the holder of the mortgage holds the mortgage in trust for the
purchaser of the note, who has an equitable right to obtain an assignment of the mortgage, which
may be accomplished by filing an action in court and obtaining an equitable order of assignment. Id.
("In some jurisdictions it is held that the mere transfer of the debt, without any assignment or even
mention of the mortgage, carries the mortgage with it, so as to enable the assignee to assert his
title in an action at law.... This doctrine has not prevailed in Massachusetts, and the tendency of
the decisions here has been, that in such cases the rrDrtgagee would hold the legal title in trust for
the purchaser of the debt, and that the latter might obtain a conveyance by a bill in equity"). See
Young v. Miller, 6 Gray 152, 154 (1856). In the absence of a valid written assignment of a mortgage
Dr a court order of assignment, the mortgage holder remains unchanged. This common-law principle
was later incorporated in the statute enacted in 1912 establishing the statutory power of sale,
which grants such a power to "the mortgagee or his executors, administrators, successors or
assigns," but not to a party that is the equitable beneficiary of a mortgage held by another. G.L c.
L83, § 2 1 , inserted by St. 1912, c. 502, § 6.
"hird, the plaintiffs initially argued that postsale assignments were sufficient to establish their
luthority to foreclose, and now argue that these assignments are sufficient when taken in
.onjunction with the evidence of a presale assignment. They argue that the use of postsaie
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assignments was customary in the industry, and point to Title Standard No. 58(3) issued by the Real
Estate Bar Association for Massachusetts, which declares: "A title is not defective by reason of...
[t]he recording of an Assignment of Mortgage executed either prior, or subsequent, to foreclosure
where said Mortgage has been foreclosed, of record, by the Assignee." [FN21] To the extent that
the plaintiffs rely on this title standard for the proposition that an entity that does not hold a
mortgage may foreclose on a property, and then cure the cloud on title by a later assignment of a
mortgage, their reliance is misplaced because this proposition is contrary to G.L c. 183, § 2 1 , and
G.L c. 244, § 14. If the plaintiffs did not have their assignments to the Ibanez and LaRace
mortgages at the time of the publication of the notices and the sales, they lacked authority to
foreclose under G.L c. 183, § 2 1 , and G.L c. 244, § 14, and their published claims to be the present
holders of the mortgages were false. Nor may a postforeclosure assignment be treated as a preforeclosure assignment simply by declaring an "effective date" that precedes the notice of sale and
foreclosure, as did Option One's assignment of the LaRace mortgage to Wells Fargo. Because an
assignment of a mortgage is a transfer of legal title, it becomes effective with respect to the power
of sale only on the transfer; it cannot become effective before the transfer. See In re Schwartz,
supra at 269.
However, we do not disagree with Title Standard No. 58(3) that, where an assignment is
:onfirmatory of an earlier, valid assignment made prior to the publication of notice and execution of
:he sale, that confirmatory assignment may be executed and recorded after the foreclosure, and
toing so will not make the title defective. A valid assignment of a mortgage gives the holder of that
nortgage the statutory power to sell after a default regardless whether the assignment has been
ecorded. See G.L c. 183, § 2 1 ; MacFarlane v. Thompson, 241 Mass. 486, 489 (1922). Where the
jarlier assignment is not in recordable form or bears some defect, a written assignment executed
ifter foreclosure that confirms the earlier assignment may be properly recorded. See Bon v. Graves,
116 Mass. 440, 444-445 (1914). A confirmatory assignment, however, cannot confirm an assignment
hat was not validly made earlier or backdate an assignment being made for the first time. See
fcap/en v. Blanchard, 187 Mass. 73, 76 (1904) (confirmatory deed "creates no title" but "takes the
lace of the original deed, and is evidence of the making of the former conveyance as of the time
then it was made"). Where there is no prior valid assignment, a subsequent assignment by the
Tortgage holder to the note holder is not a confirmatory assignment because there is no earlier
rritten assignment to confirm. In this case, based on the record before the judge, the plaintiffs
ailed to prove that they obtained valid written assignments of the Ibanez and LaRace mortgages
efore their foreclosures, so the postforeclosure assignments were not confirmatory of earlier valid
ssignments.
nally, we reject the plaintiffs' request that our ruling be prospective in its application. A
-ospective ruling is only appropriate, in limited circumstances, when we make a significant change in
le common law. See Papadopoulos v. Target Corp., 457 Mass. 368, 384 (2010) (noting "normal rule
:
retroactivity"); Payton v. Abbott Labs, 386 Mass. 540, 565 (1982). We have not done so here.
ie legal principles and requirements we set forth are well established in our case law and our
atutes. All that has changed is the plaintiffs1 apparent failure to abide by those principles and
quirements in the rush to sell mortgage-backed securities.
inclusion. For the reasons stated, we agree with the judge that the plaintiffs did not demonstrate
at they were the holders of the Ibanez and LaRace mortgages at the time that they foreclosed
ese properties, and therefore failed to demonstrate that they acquired fee simple title to these
operties by purchasing them at the foreclosure sale.
dgments affirmed.
)RDY, 1 (concurring, with whom Botsford, J., joins).
oncur fully in the opinion of the court, and write separately only to underscore that what is
prising about these cases is not the statement of principles articulated by the court regarding
e law and the law of foreclosure in Massachusetts, but rather the utter carelessness with which
i plaintiff banks documented the titles to their assets. There is no dispute that the mortgagors of
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the properties in question had defaulted on their obligations, and that the mortgaged properties were
subject to foreclosure. Before commencing such an action, however, the holder of an assigned
mortgage needs to take care to ensure that his legal paperwork is in order. Although there was no
apparent actual unfairness here to the mortgagors, that is not the point. Foreclosure is a powerful
act with significant consequences, and Massachusetts law has always required that it proceed
strictly in accord with the statutes that govern it. As the opinion of the court notes, such strict
compliance is necessary because Massachusetts is both a title theory State and allows for
extrajudicial foreclosure.
The type of sophisticated transactions leading up to the accumulation of the notes and mortgages in
question in these cases and their securitization, and, ultimately the sale of mortgaged-backed
securities, are not barred nor even burdened by the requirements of Massachusetts law. The plaintiff
banks, who brought these cases to clear the titles that they acquired at their own foreclosure sales,
have simply failed to prove that the underlying assignments of the mortgages that they allege (and
would have) entitled them to foreclose ever existed in any legally cognizable form before they
exercised the power of sale that accompanies those assignments. The court's opinion clearly states
that such assignments do not need to be in recordable form or recorded before the foreclosure, but
they do have to have been effectuated.
What is more complicated, and not addressed in this opinion, because the issue was not before us,
is the effect of the conduct of banks such as the plaintiffs here, on a bona fide third-party
purchaser who may have relied on the foreclosure title of the bank and the confirmative assignment
and affidavit of foreclosure recorded by the bank subsequent to that foreclosure but prior t o the
purchase by the third party, especially where the party whose property was foreclosed was in fact
in violation of the mortgage covenants, had notice of the foreclosure, and took no action t o contest
it.
FIM1. For the Structured Asset Securities Corporation Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates,
Series 2006-Z.

FN2. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., trustee, vs. Mark A. LaRace & another.

FN3. The Appeals Court granted the plaintiffs' motion to consolidate these cases.

FN4. Chief Justice Marshall participated in the deliberation on this case prior to her retirement.

FN5. We acknowledge the amicus briefs filed by the Attorney General; the Real Estate Bar
Association for Massachusetts, Inc.; Marie McDonnell; and the National Consumer Law Center,
together with Darlene Manson, Germano DePina, Robert Lane, Ann Coiley, Roberto Szumik, and
Geraldo Dosanjos.

FN6. The uncertainty surrounding the first issue was the reason the plaintiffs sought a
declaration of clear title in order to obtain title insurance for these properties. The second
issue was raised by the judge in the LaRace case at a January 5, 2009, case management
conference.

FN7. The judge also concluded that the Boston Globe was a newspaper of general circulation in
Springfield, so the foreclosures were not rendered invalid on that ground because notice was
published in that newspaper.
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FN8. In the third case, LaSalle Bank National Association, trustee for the certificate holders of
Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities I, LLC Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2007-HE2 vs.
Freddy Rosario, the judge concluded that the mortgage foreclosure "was not rendered invalid
by its failure to record the assignment reflecting its status as holder of the mortgage prior to
the foreclosure since it was, in fact, the holder by assignment at the time of the foreclosure, it
truthfully claimed that status in the notice, and it could have produced proof of that status
(the unrecorded assignment) if asked."

FN9. On June 1, 2009, attorneys for the defendant mortgagors filed their appearance in the
cases for the first time.

FN10. The LaRace defendants allege that the documents submitted to the judge following the
plaintiffs1 motions to vacate judgment are not properly in the record before us. They also allege
that several of these documents are not properly authenticated. Because we affirm the
judgment on other grounds, we do not address these concerns, and assume that these
documents are properly before us and were adequately authenticated.

FN11. This signed and notarized document states: "FOR VALUE RECEIVED, the undersigned
hereby grants, assigns and transfers to
all beneficial
interest under that certain Mortgage dated December 1, 2005 executed by Antonio Ibanez...."

FN12. The Structured Asset Securities Corporation is a wholly owned direct subsidiary of
Lehman Commercial Paper Inc., which is in turn a wholly owned, direct subsidiary of Lehman
Brothers Holdings Inc.

FN13. As implemented in Massachusetts, a mortgage holder is required to go to court to obtain
a judgment declaring that the mortgagor is not a beneficiary of the Servicemembers Act before
proceeding to foreclosure. St. 1943, c. 57, as amended through St. 1998, c. 142.

FN14. The Land Court judge questioned whether American Home Mortgage Servicing, Inc., was
in fact a successor in interest to Option One. Given our affirmance of the judgment on other
grounds, we need not address this question.

FN15. An alternative to foreclosure through the right of statutory sale is foreclosure by entry,
by which a mortgage holder who peaceably enters a property and remains for three years after
recording a certificate or memorandum of entry forecloses the mortgagor's right of redemption.
See G.L c. 244, §§ 1, 2; Joyner v. Lenox Sav. Bank, 322 Mass. 46, 52-53 (1947). A
foreclosure by entry may provide a separate ground for a claim of clear title apart from the
foreclosure by execution of the power of sale. See, e.g., Grabiel v. Michelson, 297 Mass. 227,
228-229 (1937). Because the plaintiffs do not claim clear title based on foreclosure by entry,
we do not discuss it further.

FN16. We recognize that a mortgage holder must not only act in strict compliance with its
power of sale but must also "act in good faith and ... use reasonable diligence to protect the
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interests of the mortgagor," and this responsibility is "more exacting" where the mortgage
holder becomes the buyer at the foreclosure sale, as occurred here. See Williams v. Resolution
GGF Oy, All Mass. 377, 382-383 (1994), quoting Seppala &Aho Constr. Co. v. Petersen, 373
Mass. 316, 320 (1977). Because the issue was not raised by the defendant mortgagors or the
judge, we do not consider whether the plaintiffs breached this obligation.
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FN17. The form of foreclosure notice provided in G.L c. 244, § 14, calls for the present holder
of the mortgage to identify itself and sign the notice. While the statute permits other forms to
be used and allows the statutory form to be "altered as circumstances require/ G.L. c. 244, §
14, we do not interpret this flexibility to suggest that the present holder of the mortgage
need not identify itself in the notice.

FN18. The plaintiffs were not authorized to foreclose by virtue of any of the other provisions of
G.L c. 244, § 14: they were not the guardian or conservator, or acting in the name of, a
person so authorized; nor were they the attorney duly authorized by a writing under seal.

FN19. Ibanez challenges the validity of this assignment to Option One. Because of the failure
of U.S. Bank to document any preforeclosure sale assignment or chain of assignments by which
it obtained the Ibanez mortgage from Option One, it is unnecessary to address the validity of
the assignment from Rose Mortgage to Option One.

FN20. The plaintiffs have not pressed the procedural question whether the judge exceeded his
authority in rendering judgment against them on their motions for default judgment, and we do
not address it here.

FN21. Title Standard No. 58(3) issued by the Real Estate Bar Association for Massachusetts
continues: "However, if the Assignment is not dated prior, or stated to be effective prior, to
the commencement of a foreclosure, then a foreclosure sale after April 19, 2007 may be
subject to challenge in the
Bankruptcy Court," citing In re Schwartz, 366 B.R. 265 (Bankr.D.Mass.2007).
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